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In recent years the study of moral development has taken a variety 
of turns and yet one question has come up time and again. "Why do 
people bother with morality in the first place?" Or as Kohlberg and 
Power so eloquently put it, "Why be moral at all'l 11 (Kohlberg and Power, 
1981). In his own cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning, 
Kohlberg sees the individual progressing through a series of stages of 
moral reasoning, but he himself concedes that the theory cannot provide 
an answer to the "Why be moral?" question (Kohlberg, 1973b). 
Indeed it would appear that this is a question that needs to be 
dealt with apart from the study of moral development per se. As Peters 
(1971) points out, there is a definite difference between under-
standing what is moral and caring about it, and it is the concept of 
moral motivation that connects the two. It does us little good as a 
society to teach our children what they should do if we cannot have at 
least some slight assurance that this is what they will do. Moral 
motivation, then, is concerned with how a person moves from what he 
believes he should do to what he actually chooses to do. 
In constructing his four-component model of moral development, 
James Rest places the moral motivation concept in perspective by 
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postulating that it is only one component of moral development. The 
major concern of this component is as follows. 
Given that a person is aware of various possible courses 
of action in a situation. each leading to a different kind 
of outcome or goal. why then would a person ever choose 
the moral alternative. especially if it involves sacri-
ficing some personal interest or enduring some hardship? 
(Rest. 1984. p. 32) 
In order to be more specific. the question. for the purposes of 
this study. will be rephrased to ask. '~hat factors are related to the 
way in which an individual decides whether or not to 'choose the moral 
alternative'?" 
The very fact that Rest talks about making a moral choice at all 
implies that there are alternatives from which to make that choice. and 
research would appear to support that contention. As Alston (1971) 
points out. while an individual may behave in a manner consistent with 
one stage of moral reasoning. it is entirely possible that he may be 
capable of reasoning and understanding at a higher stage. This would 
suggest that the individual is not locked into a single stage. but that 
he has a range of alternatives at his disposal. Along this line. 
Mischel and Mischel (1976) note that in testing situations individuals 
tend to respond with reasoning from several different stages. and it is 
not at all uncommon to find less than fifty percent of an individual's 
moral judgments falling within any one particular stage. Despite this 
low percentage. the modal stage is often taken as an indicator of 
overall moral development. It seems clear that the fact that an 
individual ever ·uses anything other than the modal stage is an 




In suggesting his hierarchy of spontaneous use. comprehension. and 
preference for moral stage reasoning. Rest (1973) has suggested not only 
that there is. in fact. a range of alternatives. but that this range has 
some very definite characteristics. Wherever an individual may fall in 
the stages of moral development. these three aspects of moral 
development will exist and will exist in a consistent order. 
Spontaneous use will consistently be the lowest of the three. 
Spontaneous use refers to the type of reasoning used by an individual 
when he is presented with a moral dilemma and given no guidelines as to 
how it should be solved. This is the type of moral reasoning discussed 
by Kohlberg and measured by his Moral Judgment Interview. Asked an 
open-ended question such as. "What should be done in this situation?" 
the individual is free to respond in whatever way he chooses. As 
mentioned earlier. this is often measured by the modal stage. the stage 
at which he responds most often. Thus. if he responds to dilemmas most 
often with solutions that employ Stage Three moral reasoning. his level 
of spontaneous use is said to be Stage Three. 
Somewhat higher than this will be the level of moral comprehension. 
While an individual may spontaneously use Stage Three moral reasoning 
most of the time. if presented with arguments that exemplify a variety 
of stages of moral reasoning. he would probably be able to comprehend a 
Stage Four argument. that is. he would be intellectually capable of 
understanding the reasoning used in a Stage Four argument. His level of 
comprehension would thus be higher than his level of spontaneous use. 
Higher still would be the level of preference. When asked to pick the 
best moral arguments out of several presented. an individual can usually 
be expected to show a preference for arguments at stages even higher 
than that which he comprehends (Rest, 1973). 
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Each person, then, has a level of moral reasoning that he spon-
taneously uses, a slightly higher level that he comprehends, and a still 
higher level that he prefers. It has been shown clearly that 
spontaneous use, comprehension, and preference actually do form a 
hierarchy (Rest. 1973), but the question of why differences between 
these three measures may be large for one individual and small for 
another has gone largely unexplored. Rest's work has been used 
primarily for the purpose of theory-building (Rest, 1976). but to this 
point, very little notice has been taken of the individual differences 
involved. How is it that two people may both spontaneously use Stage 3 
moral reasoning and yet one of them shows a preference for Stage 6 
reasoning and the other shows a preference for Stage 4? And what do 
these differences tell us about each of these individuals' motivation to 
behave morally or about how their patterns of moral reasoning can be 
expected to change over time? 
Before these questions can be answered, it will be necessary to de-
scribe more completely (1) the exact nature of the relationship between 
spontaneous use. comprehension, and preference. and (2) the relationship 
between other important variables and these aspects of moral reasoning. 
As a first step in approaching the question of individual differences in 
range of moral reasoning, this study will examine the relationship 
between selected variables and each of these three aspects. If. as Rest 
(1973) suggests. these three aspects comprise the range of an 
individual's responses to a moral dilemma. then whatever factors are 
related to these aspects, individually, should be related to the range. 
Spontaneous use will be operationally defined in this study by 
performance on the Standard Moral Judgment Interview (Colby and 
Kohlberg. in press); comprehension by performance on the Comprehension 
of Social-Moral Concepts Test (Rest. Cooper. Coder. Masanz and Anderson. 
1974); and preference by performance on the Defining Issues Test (Rest. 
1979). The variables to be examined in looking for relationships to 
these measures will be age. sex. and locus of control as measured by 
Rotter's I-E Scale (Rotter. 1966). A brief rationale for the inclusion 
of each of these variables will now be stated. 
Age 
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The very nature of moral development theory suggests that as 
individuals age. they move through stages of moral reasoning from lower 
to higher. Since each of the three measures of moral reasoning involved 
here (spontaneous use. comprehension. and preference) can be expected to 
increase with age. it seems reasonable to expect that they might also 
change in relationship to each other. In fact. research suggests that 
that may very well be the case. 
First of all. as an individual's spontaneous use of moral reasoning 
approaches the upper stages (5 and 6) of moral development. it appears 
that there may be some sort of shift in the way the developmental proc-
ess continues. As Gibbs (1977) suggests. reflection may be very 
important and the individual's awareness of the developmental process 
itself may be what initiates the stages of post-conventional moral 
reasoning. A similar suggestion is made by Murphy and Gilligan (1980) 
where they contend that there is a cognitive shift in adult moral devel-
opment that is based on the different experiences of moral choice and 
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responsibility that typically occur after adolescence. Both Rest (1973) 
and Coder (1975) also report that change in adult moral reasoning may 
have more to do with real-life experiences than do changes that occur in 
adolescence or childhood which seem to have more to do with general 
cognitive development. 
All of this seems to relate to the original concern for how a 
person comes to "choose the moral alternative." Indeed it is Kohlberg's 
contention that in adulthood autonomous choice becomes more important 
than social pressure in making moral judgments (Kohlberg. 1984). And it 
should be remembered at this point that choice is what the differentia-
tion between spontaneous use. comprehension. and preference is all 
about. Even though an individual may display a preference for higher 
stage moral reasoning. he still chooses (spontaneously uses) a lower 
stage. If. as Carroll and Rest (1981) contend. preference (which is the 
highest of the three measures) shows little or no increase over time. 
then might it not be that in the course of development the two lower 
measures would move up to meet it. or come close to meeting it? The net 
effect of aging. then. would be for the differences between the three 
measures to decrease. That being the case. if preference is thought of 
as potential. might it not be said that an older person could come 
closer to actually behaving up to his moral potential than a younger 
person? And conversely it might also suggest that a younger person with 
a wider range of moral reasoning would. for some reason or other. not be 
behaving up to his potential. 
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Sex 
The basic controversy in this area is whether or not men and women 
use the same rationales in making moral judgments. It is Kohlberg's 
contention (Kohlberg. 1984) that there are no significant differences in 
moral reasoning between the sexes. The primary opposition to this point 
of view comes from Carol Gilligan and her associates (Gilligan. 1982; 
Gilligan. Langdale. Lyons. and Murphy. 1982). Their position is (1) 
that there are two orientations involved in the moral decision-making 
process--one based upon justice and one based upon care. and (2) that 
women predominately tend to base their moral judgments on the ethic of 
care while men tend to use the ethic of justice (Gilligan et al •• 1982). 
They contend that Kohlberg's theory of moral development largely ignores 
the ethic of care and that it is. therefore. biased against women. 
The present study will not attempt to determine whether or not 
Kohlberg's theory is biased. but will focus rather on whether or not any 
pattern of differences can be shown between the sexes across all three 
measures of moral reasoning. By looking at all three measures on the 
same sample. it can be determined whether or not there are any consis-
tent differences in moral reasoning as a whole or if the differences are 
restricted to only one or two measures of moral reasoning. 
Locus of Control 
This variable will be included mainly on logical grounds. It 
simply stands to reason that a person whose locus of control is highly 
internal would be less likely to allow what Rest calls "preemption" of 
his moral ideals than a person whose locus of control is external. and 
this does. in fact. appear to be the case. In his study of the 
relationships of self-esteem. achievement motivation. and locus of 
control to moral reasoning. Prawat (1976) found that high degrees of 
internality correlated with high levels of moral reasoning. 
Methodology and Hypotheses 
In summary. each of the variables. age. sex. and locus of control. 
included in this study has been shown to be related to one or more of 
the three aspects of moral reasoning. That being the case. it seems 
reasonable to expect that they might be related to the particular 
grouping of these three aspects for a given individual. 
Briefly. the methodology used to study these relationships was as 
follows. All of the subjects in the sample (which included equal 
numbers of males and females) were given each of the previously men-
tioned tests in order to assess the following: 
1. level of spontaneous use of moral stage reasoning 
2. level of comprehension of moral stage reasoning 
3. level of preference for moral stage reasoning 
4. locus of control. 
Correlations were then calculated between each of the three 
measures of moral reasoning and the other variables involved in the 
study. It was hypothesized that significant relationships would be 
found between: 
1. spontaneous use and the set of variables including age. sex, 
locus of control. 
2. comprehension and the set of variables including age. sex. and 
locus of control. 
3. preference and the set of variables including age. sex. and 
locus of control. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The purpose of this study is to examine the factors that are 
related to the way in which an individual engages in the moral decision-
making process. In order to address this purpose. this review will be 
organized in the following manner: 
A. General Theory. This is an overview of the moral stage theory 
of Lawrence Kohlberg and its significance to this study. 
B. Moral Motivation. This section presents support for a general 
theory of moral motivation; motivation not to moral behavior but to 
moral development. The concern here is not why people choose the moral 
alternative. but why. as Kohlberg's theory suggests. they are constantly 
deriving more sophisticated rationales for making their moral choices. 
In simple terms. the question is "Why does moral development take 
place?" 
C. Hierarchy of Measures of Moral Development. This section deals 
with the hierarchy of spontaneous use. comprehension. and preference for 
moral stages; how it was created and how it was used in this study. The 
section is a logical extension of Sections A and B. Section A presented 
the basic developmental process of moral decision-making. Section B 
suggested why the process takes place. and this section suggests how the 
process takes place and how it can be measured. 
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D. Adult Development. This is the next step in the progression 
set forth in the first three sections. It deals with how the moral 
decision-making process changes throughout the life-span, and why age 
is, therefore, an important variable in this study. 
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E. Other Variables. Variables other than age are introduced, and 
supporting research is presented. 
F. Hypotheses. 
General Theory 
The basic framework within which this study will operate is the 
cognitive-development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg. Since the theory was 
first introduced (Kohlberg, 1958), it has been the subject of much dis-
cussion and the basis for considerable research. As might be expected, 
it has also been severely criticized. A summary of some of the more 
substantial criticisms and Kohlberg's reply can be found in Kohlberg, 
Levine and Hewer (1983). but these are, for the most part, beyond the 
scope of this study and will not be discussed here. It should be noted, 
however, that none of Kohlberg's critics have suggested that his stage 
structure is totally inaccurate. Shortcomings have been pointed out and 
refinements proposed particularly for the later stages (some of these 
will be discussed later in this chapter), but there has generally been a 
consensus that something similar to Kohlberg's stages do, in fact, occur 
in the course of normal development. In keeping with this consensus, 
this study will use Kohlberg's stages as a rough outline of the develop-
ment of moral reasoning. A summary of that stage structure is presented 






CLASSIFICATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT INTO 
LEVELS AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
Basis of Moral Judgment 
Moral value resides in 
·external, quasiphysical 
happenings, in bad acts, 
or in quasiphysical 
needs rather than in 
persons and standards. 
Moral value resides in 
performing good or 
right roles, in main-
taining the conventional 
order and the expec-
tancies of others. 
Stages of Development 
Stage 1: Obedience and punish-
ment orientation. Egocentric 
deference to superior power or 
prestige, or a trouble-avoiding 
set. Objective responsibility. 
Stage 2: Naively egoistic 
orientation. Right action is 
that instrumentally satisfying 
the self's needs and occasion-
ally others'. Awareness of 
relativism of value to each 
actor's needs and perspective. 
Naive egalitarianism and 
orientation to exchange and 
reciprocity. 
Stage 3: Good-boy orientation. 
Orientation to approval and to 
pleasing and helping others. 
Conformity to stereotypical 
images of majority or natural 
role behavior, and judgment by 
intentions. 
Stage 4: Authority and social-
order maintaining orientation. 
Orientation to "doing duty" and 
to showing respect for authority 
and maintaining the given social 
order for its own sake. Regard 
for earned expectations of 
others. 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Levels 
III 
Basis of Moral Judgment 
Moral value resides in 
conformity by the self 
to shared or sharable 
standards. rights or 
duties. 
Source: Kohlberg. 1967. p. 171. 
Stages of Development 
Stage 5: Contractual legalistic 
orientation. Recognition of an 
arbitrary element or starting 
point in rules or expectations 
for the sale of agreement. Duty 
defined in terms of contract. 
general avoidance of violation 
of the will or rights of others. 
and majority will and welfare. 
Stage 6: Conscience or principle 
orientation. Orientation not 
only to actually ordained social 
rules but to principles of 
choice involving appeal to 
logical universality and con-
sistency. Orientation to con-
science as a directing agent 
and to mutual respect and trust. 
One point that should be made regarding Kohlberg's theory is that 
it deals with moral reasoning. As Kohlberg himself states. "I have 
always tried to be clear that my stages are stages of justice reasoning. 
not of emotions. aspirations. or action" (Kohlberg. 1984. p. 224). The 
importance of this distinction for the purpose of this study is that the 
stages deal with how an individual reasons about morality and not with 
how he feels about it. Reasoning is a rational process. feeling is an 
emotional process. Feeling goes beyond reasoning in that it includes 
things which are not necessarily rational and which the individual may 
not even fully understand. This will be discussed further in the 
section on moral motivation. 
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It should also be noted at this point that this study is not 
attempting to either prove or disprove Kohlberg's ideas on how an indi-
vidual progresses through these stages. They are included here merely 
as background material for the discussion of moral motivation and 
various factors associated with moral motivation. 
Moral Motivation 
At its simplest level, moral motivation is concerned with the basic 
"Why be moral?" question. Why does an individual ever choose the moral 
alternative. especially when it may conflict with his own interests? At 
this level. the question may be sufficiently complicated that it cannot 
be answered. ''Why be moral?" may very well belong in the same category 
with "What is the meaning of life?" and that is certainly beyond the 
scope of this study. 
What was studied then was a measurable situation in which people 
don't choose the moral alternative, or at least don't choose the 
alternative that they, themselves. actually feel is best for a given 
situation. This is precisely what happens when an individual's level of 
preference considerably exceeds his level of spontaneous use. This is a 
rather curious situation, and when looked at with respect to moral moti-
vation (why the individual is choosing the alternative he is choosing), 
it is very different from the situation in which an individual's level 
of preference does not exceed his level of spontaneous use. It is one 
thing for a person to choose a particular course of action (at whatever 
stage of moral reasoning it may be) because that is the best he can do, 
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but it is very different for him to choose that same course of action 
when it can be empirically demonstrated that he understands and even 
prefers higher stages of moral reasoning. It would certainly seem that 
the motivational influences in these two situations must be different. 
As a first step toward trying to determine what those influences 
might be. this study will look at relationships between the measures of 
moral reasoning and several variables (age. sex. and locus of control) 
which might be related to the moral decision-making process. Where 
significant relationships are found. follow-up studies can then address 
the motivation question more directly. but the main practical benefit of 
the present study will be to provide direction for future research. 
In reviewing the literature on moral motivation. the focus will be 
on the individual's reasoning processes regarding morality and his emo-
tional responses to moral dilemma situations. It is suggested that 
differences between these two correspond in a very general way to dif-
ferences between spontaneous use and preference. spontaneous use being 
considered to be primarily a reasoning process and preference being con-
sidered to be primarily an emotional response. 
In using Kohlberg's theory as a starting point for the discussion 
of moral motivation. it should be noted first of all that the theory 
really does not include any source of motivation. This is not. however. 
a damning accusation. Kohlberg himself readily admits (Power & 
Kohlberg. 1980) that his theory provides no answers to questions such as 
"Why be moral?" or "Why be at all?" and suggests that these questions 
are only to be answered in terms of religious convictions. He sees the 
usefulness of the theory lying in its ability to provide understanding 
and problem-solving in the area of moral dilemmas rather than motiva-
tion. As others have noted, though, this is a distinction that can be 
very difficult to draw. Peters (1971) suggests: 
This links with another central aspect of morality. to which 
Kohlberg pays too little attention, namely, the intimate con-
nection between knowing the difference between right and 
wrong, and caring. It is not a logical contradiction to say 
that someone knows that it is wrong to cheat but has no dis-
position not to cheat, but it could not be the general case; 
for the general function of words like "right" and "wrong", 
"good" and "bad" is to move people to act. If there is no 
such disposition to act in a particular case, we would say 
that the person is using the term in an external sort of way, 
or that he is not sincere, or something similar to that. 
(Peters, 1971, p. 261) 
What this appears to suggest is that there must be a connection 
between a person's concept of what is ideally "right" and what that 
person actually chooses to do in a particular situation. 
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This connection is also taken up by Pahel (1976) in his discussion 
of moral motivation. He suggests that moral growth involves the gradual 
development of (a) moral understanding and (b) feeling dispositions such 
as a sense of justice or an abhorrence of suffering. He further 
suggests that there needs to be a harmony or fit between these two 
capacities in order for the individual to achieve anything like genuine 
conviction or sincerity. Without this harmony or fit, moral judgments 
tend to be rather intellectual and shallow and do not actually serve as 
motivating influences. It is only when moral judgments are backed up by 
the feeling dispositions that they become a sound basis for moral 
conviction and moral action. The implication here for the present study 
lies in the changing pattern of the three measures of moral reasoning 
over time. If the "gaps" between these measures do, in fact, decrease 
as a person matures, does this not create a greater harmony between 
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understanding and feeling as Pahel sees them? And following his line of 
reasoning. does this greater harmony not then produce a greater depth of 
conviction? 
A study by Sharie McNamee (1977) gives at least a suggestion of an 
answer to these questions. In her study she examined the reactions of 
102 college students (all volunteers) to a carefully prepared moral 
dilemma situation. As each subject and the experimenter were about to 
enter the testing room: 
A confederate arrived. presenting himself as the next subject 
for the experiment. He stated that he was not going to be 
able to do the experiment. He said that he has just taken 
drugs and was having a bad time. He came to the experiment 
because he thought that the experimenter. being a psycholo-
gist. could help him. 
The response of the experimenter was that she was a research 
psychologist. not a therapist. 
The drug-user persisted in soliciting aid. hoping that the 
experimenter could refer him to help. 
The experimenter replied that she had no experience with drugs 
and did not know what facility could help him. 
She told him to reschedule his testing session. 
The drug-user slowly left the room (McNamee. 1977. pp.27-28). 
The subjects were faced with the possibility of either remaining 
uninvolved observers or intervening and offering assistance to the drug-
user. At the end of this encounter. the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Inter-
view was administered to each subject. The actual purpose of the 
experiment was to examine the relationship between the subject's levels 
of moral reasoning and their willingness to offer help to the drug-user. 
It was found that for each ascending stage of moral reasoning. a 
greater percentage of subjects made a helping response: Stage 2. 9 
percent; Stage 3. 28 percent; Stage 4. 38 percent; Stage 5. 68 percent; 
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Stage 6, 100 percent. However, more importantly for the purposes of 
this study, when interviewed after completion of the experiment, 72 
percent of the subjects stated that they thought they should have helped 
the drug-user, when in fact only 43 percent did help. Similar figures 
were reported for each stage of moral reasoning, and as moral reason-
ing level increased, the discrepancies between these two percentages 
decreased. As McNamee reports: 
At Stage 2, 36 percent thought they should help, but only 11 
percent did help. At Stage 3. 77 percent thought they should 
help, but only 27 percent did. At Stage 4, 69 percent thought 
they should help and 38 percent did. At Stage 5, 80 percent 
thought they should help and 60 percent did. At Stage 6, 100 
percent thought they should help and 100 percent did in fact 
help. There can be seen a trend toward increased consistency 
between the subject's feeling of responsibility and actual 
helping behavior at progressive stages of development. Only 
at Stage 6 did everyone do what they thought they should do 
(McNamee, 1977, p. 29). 
For the purposes of this study, the specific behavior is not that 
important, but it does suggest that the subjects must first make some 
sort of decision as to what course of action to take. There are two 
important points to note in regard to this finding. First, the fact 
that more subjects said the drug-user should be helped than actually 
helped him, and second, the fact that both of these percentages 
increased as moral reasoning level increased. Since "feeling of 
responsibility" was consistently more common than actual helping 
behavior, it might be suggested that "feeling" could serve as a motiva-
tion for advances in moral reasoning. Many of the subjects in this 
experiment felt responsible for the drug-user, they thought they should 
help him. Yet whatever levels of reasoning they used to decide on a 
course of action did not allow them to carry out these feelings. But as 
moral reasoning levels increased. they became increasingly able to do 
so. and at Stage 6 they did so perfectly. 
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The implication for a theory of moral motivation is this. At lower 
stages of moral reasoning. an individual is unable to put his feelings 
about moral situations into practice. In order to do so he must develop 
higher stages of moral reasoning. and the fact that moral feelings are 
more advanced than moral reasoning serves as motivation for advances in 
moral reasoning. 
Although interpretations vary. the idea of moral feelings serving 
as a motivation toward higher moral reasoning has been discussed by 
others. perhaps most prominently by Martin Hoffman (1982a. 1982b. 1984). 
The major component of Hoffman's theo.ry is a concept that he calls em-
pathic arousal. This term refers to a state of emotional alertness that 
is brought about by seeing another person in distress. Hoffman (1982a) 
suggests that people of all ages experience empathic arousal and that it 
may even be a largely involuntary reaction. Logically. this fits in 
nicely with the theories already discussed and can serve as a strong 
motivation. However. as Hoffman also points out. while the state of 
empathic arousal and the guilt that may accompany it generally serve as 
motivations toward action. they may not motivate a person toward higher 
levels of moral reasoning. If the individual's only concern is to 
relieve guilt and reduce the pangs of empathic arousal. he may simply 
try to avoid the situation that produced the arousal (Hoffman. 1980). A 
good example of this idea is found in the well-known Biblical account of 
the Good Samaritan. Seeing the man who had fallen among thieves lying 
by the side of the road was an empathy-arousing situation for all three 
passersby. but the priest and the Levite reduced that arousal by 
avoiding the situation while the Samaritan reduced the arousal by 
helping (Luke 10:30-35). 
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In much the same way that the need to reduce empathic arousal or 
avoid guilt can be a motivation to moral action. the need to reduce cog-
nitive dissonance can serve as a motivation to moral .development. This 
is the contention of Rholes. Bailey. and McMillan (1982) and supported 
by their research. On the pretext that they were assisting the 
experimenter in a study of persuasion techniques. the subjects (college 
students) were asked to video tape persuasive messages on the subject of 
euthanasia that would subsequently be shown to high school students. 
For each subject the message was to be counterattitudinal. that is. 
opposite the subject's own position on the issue. Supporters of 
euthanasia delivered messages against it and vice versa. The purpose 
was to observe what sort of effect this would have on the subject's 
levels of moral reasoning. The subjects were randomly assigned to two 
groups. one in which they were simply assigned to tape the counter-
attitudinal messages (no choice). and the other in which they were given 
a choice to either make the tapes or not (free choice). Those who chose 
to make the tapes were thus in a dissonance-producing situation; they 
were choosing to advocate a position with which they did not agree. 
In addition. the messages were tailored to the individual subjects. 
Each subject delivered a message that contained arguments either one 
stage above or one stage below that individual's own characteristic 
level of moral reasoning. as assessed prior to taping by Rest's Defining 
Issues Test (Rest. 1979). The most significant result of the study was 
the finding that subjects in the free choice/higher stage argument group 
showed both significantly more advanced moral reasoning after the taping 
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and greater change in attitude toward euthanasia than the other groups. 
This would appear to suggest two things concerning moral development. 
First of all. it will be more likely to occur under circumstances that 
promote cognitive dissonance (free choice) than under circumstances that 
don't (no choice). Secondly. it will be more likely to occur in 
situations in which people are exposed to moral arguments at a stage 
higher than their own characteristic level of functioning. 
The importance of the Rholes. et al.. (1982) findings to this study 
lie in the fact that they appear to build on the foundation of Hoffman's 
ideas. Empathic arousal motivates moral action. according to Hoffman. 
and this leads to a choice on the part of the individual. Like the 
characters in the Good Samaritan story. one either helps or avoids the 
situation. Then. according to Rholes. et al •• the act of making the 
choice. particularly if it is a choice that goes against one's natural 
inclinations. produces cognitive dissonance. and this motivates advances 
in moral reasoning. So the Good Samaritan. besides earning honorable 
mention in the Bible. also placed himself in a state of cognitive 
dissonance which very likely brought about an increase in his level of 
moral reasoning. 
In summary. the discussion of moral motivation to this point has 
focused on the relationship between moral reasoning and moral feelings 
and the way in which motivation can arise from this relationship. There 
are. of course. other theories of moral motivation (see Rest. 1984 for a 
brief review of several). but only this one is presented here because it 
is this one which serves as a basis for this study. The general con-
sensus of the literature presented so far is that moral motivation stems 
from some sort of interaction between moral reasoning and the 
individual's feelings about morality. Given that. the question is 
asked. "How shall this relationship be studied?" In considering this 
question. Robert Kegan points out that one must consider more than 
simply moral stages. In addition to this structure. the movement from 
stage to stage is also important. As he says. 
When the structures are taken as the basic consideration. the 
framework is unavoidably cognitive. When we study the motion 
which gives rise to these constructions. and the experience of 
this motion. we discover the very source of our emotions 
(Kegan. 1980. p. 408). 
Thus by studying the process or the motion of moral development. 
and the motivation which necessitates it. the effects of feelings are 
added to the effects of reasoning to produce a more comprehensive pic-
21 
ture of what actually happens as a person progresses through the stages 
of moral reasoning. 
Hierarchy of Measures of Moral Development 
Taking into account the role of feelings and other factors which 
influence an individual's choice of a course of action is part of what 
James Rest has done in constructing his four-component theory of mor-
ality (Rest. 1984). In this theory. each component is part of a 
step-by-step process that leads to action. The four components can be 
briefly summarized as follows: (1) interpreting the situation in terms 
of recognizing what actions are possible for the actor and how each 
course of action affects all parties involved (assessment); (2) figuring 
out what one ought to do. applying moralideals to the situation to 
determine the moral course of action (reasoning); (3) choosing among 
moral and nonmoral values to decide on what one actually intends to do 
(judgment); and (4) executing and implementing what one intends to do 
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(action). Additional information on these components and supporting 
research are presented in Table II which is reprinted from Rest (1984). 
The stages of moral reasoning that have so often been used in moral 
development research are part of what Rest calls Component 2. Useful as 
the concept of moral reasoning has been. Rest does not at all see it as 
being complete. 
Reasoning about justice is no more the whole of morality than 
is empathy. A score from a moral judgment test does not tell 
us how sensitive the person is even to noticing moral prob-
lems. It does not tell us what other values may pre-empt or 
compromise one's moral ideals. nor does it tell us how well a 
person is able to carry through on one's moral convictions 
(Rest. 1984. p. 32). 
For the purposes of this study. Component 3 will be the most impor-
tant one. This component is primarily a practical evaluation of the 
second component. Once the individual has decided what would be the 
moral thing to do in a given situation (Component 2). he asks himself. 
"All things considered (moral and nonmoral values). is that really what 
I want to do?" (Component 3). This paper will obviously not consider 
all moral and nonmoral values. but it will consider age. sex. and locus 
of control and examine how they are related to the difference between an 
individual's moral reasoning (Component 2) and what he actually intends 
to do (Component 3). 
In order to study the process by which an individual moves from 
stage to stage in moral development. one must know where that individual 
is in the first place. Since Kohlberg introduced his interview measure-
ment technique in 1958. it has been a primary means of assessing this 
position. But in addition to this. the pattern of responses to 
Kohlberg's questions also ~ives an indication of where the individual is 
headed. As Alston (1971) points out. the stage which Kohlberg's 
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TABLE II 
INNER PROCESSES PRODUCING BEHAVIOR 
Component 1 
Major functions of the process: To interpret the situation in terms of 
how one's actions affect the welfare of others. 
Exemplary research: Response to emergencies. Staub (1978. 1979) and 
Schwartz (1977); social cognition development. Shantz (in press and 
Selman (1980); Empathy. Hoffman (1977. in press). 
Cognitive-affective interactions: Drawing inferences about how the 
other will be affected and feeling empathy. disgust. and so on. for 
the other. 
Component 2 
Major functions: To formulate what a moral course of action would be; 
to identify the moral ideal in a specific situation. 
Exemplary research: Cognitive-developmental. Piaget (1932/1965) and 
Kohlberg (1969. 1976); DIT research. Rest (1979) and Damon (1977); 
social psychology "norms". Berkowitz & Daniels (1963) and Schwartz 
(1977); post-Piagetian. Keasey (1978). 
Cognitive-affective interaction: Both abstract-logical and attitudinal 
valuing aspects are involved in the construction of systems of 
moral meaning; moral ideals are composed of cognitive and affec-
tive elements. 
Component 3 
Major functions: To select among competing value outcomes of ideals. 
the one to act on; deciding whether or not to try to fulfill one's 
moral ideal. 
Exemplary research: Decision-making models and factors that affect 
decision making. Pomazel & Jacard (1976). Lerner (1971). Schwartz 
(1977). and Isen (1978); theories of moral motivation. E. Wilson 
(1975). Aronfreed (1968). Bandura (1977). Kbhlberg (1969). Hoffman 
(in press). Durkheim (1925/1961). and Rawls (1971). 
Cognitive-affective interactions: Calculation of relative utilities of 
various goals; mood influencing outlook; defensive distortion of 
perception; empathy impelling decisions; social understanding 
motivating the choice of goals. 
Component 4 
Major function: To execute and implement what one intends to do. 
Exemplary research: Ego strength and self-regulation. Mischel & Mischel 
(1976). Krebs (Note 1). and Staub (1979). 
Cognitive-affective interaction: Task persistence as affected by cog-
nitive transformation of the goal. 
Source: Rest. 1984. p. 27 
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interview describes as the individual's predominate stage of moral 
reasoning is his modal response. It does not represent his capacity. it 
is merely the stage at which he most often responds. It is obvious from 
the fact that he sometimes responds with moral reasoning from stages 
higher than his predominate stage that he does have some understanding 
of these higher stages. 
It is this type of finding that has brought about the study of the 
differences between spontaneous use, comprehension, and preference for 
stages of moral reasoning. One of the earliest studies to examine these 
differences was done by Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969). In this 
study. Kohlberg's interview was administered to a group of fifth graders 
and a group of eighth graders in order to determine their predominate 
stages of moral reasoning. This is considered to be a measure of spon-
taneous use. After this the subjects were exposed to moral arguments 
using reasoning from three different stages in relation to the subject's 
predominate stage: one stage below the subject's predominate stage, one 
stage above the predominate stage. and two stages above the predominate 
stage. The subject's task was to select the "best" argument from this 
group of three. 
The results of this study include two statistically significant 
findings that have relevance for the present study. First of all. the 
subjects expressed a significant preference for the arguments one stage 
abo~e and two stages above their own predominate stages. The proba-
bility of subjects preferring the lower stage argument at less than ex-
pectancy was less than .01. Despite the fact that they themselves 
generally functioned at a lower stage. the subjects somehow felt that 
these higher stage arguments were "better" than their own predominate 
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stages. The second important finding deals with the way in which these 
two higher stages were differentiated from each other. In order to de-
termine how well the subjects understood the higher stage arguments. 
they were asked to recapitulate the arguments (reconstruct them from 
memory) after the testing was completed. It was found that of the 
subjects who preferred the +1 arguments. 43 percent of them accurately 
recapitulated that argument. Of the subjects who preferred the +2 
arguments. only 28 percent could accurately recapitulate the +2 argu-
ment. This difference in accuracy was found to be significant at the 
.001 level and was interpreted to mean that the +2 argument was more 
difficult for subjects to understand than the +1 argument. 
The importance of these findings lies in the fact that they suggest 
the general hierarchy of spontaneous use. comprehension. and preference. 
Clearly preference tends to be for a higher stage than that which is 
used spontaneously. Comprehension also exceeds spontaneous use. but not 
to as great a degree. Thus for any individual. one would expect to 
observe. in ascending order. the level of spontaneous use. followed by 
comprehension. and then preference. This order was confirmed in another 
study by Rest (1973). 
These findings are important also in regard to the earlier 
discussion of reasoning and feeling. In a general way the concepts of 
spontaneous use. comprehension. and preference can be seen as including 
reasoning and feeling. and this has definite implications for motiva-
tion. Despite the fact that an individual may choose to function at a 
particular stage. these studies provide evidence that he comprehends 
higher stages than that. and more importantly that he has a preference 
for stages even higher than the highest he comprehends. Thus at 
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whatever stage a person finds himself predominately functioning. he 
still knows that there is a better way. there is a higher level of 
morality. even though he may not be able to understand it. And therein 
lies the motivation. The awareness of a higher level. the preference 
for a higher level. is a counterpart of the "feeling of responsibility" 
previously mentioned in the McNamee (1977) study. This is where 
feelings are out in front of reasoning. It is the advanced level of an 
individual's feelings (preference) about morality that tells him his 
predominate level of reasoning (spontaneous use) is not the most ade-
quate level available. and this knowledge serves as his motivation to 
try and bring his reasoning abilities up to the level of his feelings. 
Adult Development 
If the gap between an individual's reasoning and feelings is seen 
as the motivation for advances in moral reasoning. what does that sug-
gest about changes in motivation over time? If an individual is. in 
fact. attempting to close that gap by developing more sophisticated 
moral reasoning. couldn't it be expected that he would eventually get 
the job done? And doesn't that imply that there is a limit to how far 
this type of motivation can take a person? Current research in this 
area would appear to suggest that the answer to all of these questions 
is "Yes" (Gibbs. 1977; Gibbs. 1979; M:i_schel &. Mischel. 1976; Murphy & 
Gilligan. 1980; Rest. 1978). 
In combining the results of over fifty different studies dealing 
with 5.714 subjects. Rest (1979) observes that there appears to be a 
leveling out of moral development in early adulthood. For the most 
part. moral .. development tends to advance as long as an individual is in 
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school and then remain pretty much the same. Although. as Rest points 
out. there is not sufficient longitudinal evidence to say that moral 
development stops in early adulthood. this has been the general indica-
tion from a large number of cross-sectional studies. 
At least a partial explanation for this finding is put forth by 
Mischel and Mischel (1976). They suggest that a certain portion of what 
passes for moral development can actually be accounted for by general 
cognitive development. 
Consider. for example. the differences in how a 12-year-old 
delinquent from a lower socioeconomic class family and a 
professor in an Ivy League college might handle moral dilem-
mas in ways that result in the delinquent's being assigned to 
Stage 2 or 3 of Kohlberg's scale of moral maturity. while the 
professor is likely to reach higher levels. To understand the 
differences between these two people it is necessary to take 
account of the differences in their cognitive and verbal 
skills as well as in the ways in which moral issues and 
conduct are represented and treated in their respective 
experiences. In part. the delinquent youngster and the 
professor differ in the cognitive and linguistic maturity with 
which they can conceptualize and articulate "reasons." That 
is likely to be the case regardless of whether the issues 
about which they are asked to reason are moral dilemmas or 
morally irrelevant--for example. esthetic judgments about why 
they prefer particular paintings. books. movies. or music. 
When justifying either his moral reasoning or his esthetic 
preferences (or any other choice. morally relevent or not) the 
professor is likely to deal in "higher" abstractions (e.g •• 
about justice. about beauty). to invoke more generalized rules 
(e.g. about reciprocity in ethics. about harmony in esthetics) 
than will the 12-year-old. The latter is likely to be not 
only more concrete but also more self-centered and 
peer-centered in his explanations (Mischel & Mischel. 1976. 
pp. 95 & 96). 
Considering this argument. then. it might be expected that as the 
12-year-old matures and gains greater cognitive skills and great ability 
to express himself. many of the apparent differences between him and the 
professor will disappear. If this is taken to be true. what then 
becomes of moral development once the maturational process has removed 
differences in cognitive skills? 
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In dealing with this question. Gibbs (1979) divides Kohlberg's six 
stages into two parts: stages 1 through 4 and stages 5 and 6. He sees 
the first four stages as being a natural. developmental progression. 
But stages 5 and 6. according to Gibbs. are of a more existential nature 
and do not develop naturally. Rather they are achieved only through 
"meta-ethical reflection" (Gibbs. 1977). This involves a basic shift at 
some point from standard (child) moral development to existential 
(adult) moral development. In essence what Gibbs is saying is that 
stages 5 and 6 are not simply a continuation of what went before. they 
are qualitatively different. and they come about as a result of a 
conscious effort on the part of the individual to find meaning. or as it 
has been described here. to bring reasoning in line with feelings. 
Murphy and Gilligan (1980) also suggest some kind of shift in moral 
development as an individual reaches the upper stages of Kohlberg's 
framework. They have labelled this shift "contextual relativizing" and 
they contend that at some point the individual will come to the realiza-
tion that all moral judgments are not black and white and that they are. 
in fact. contextually relative. The right thing to do then may very 
well change from situation to situation. For an individual who espoused 
that position. the determination of what is right in a given situation 
could not be an "off-the-rack" statement of the individual's present 
level of development. but instead would require the kind of reflection 
that Gibbs discussed. 
The last three authors cited have suggested that there is more 
involved in the upper stages of moral development than merely increased 
cognitive ability. There is also a logical problem with the cognitive 
development idea that is pointed out by Locke (1980). If cognitive 
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conflict is used to explain why a person moves from stage to stage. what 
happens when that person reaches the highest stage and all conflicts are 
resolved? This same problem can be stated in the terms of the hierarchy 
already discussed. If the hierarchy of spontaneous use. comprehension. 
and preference exists. and each of these three concepts advances as an 
individual ages. what happens when preference. being the highest of the 
three. reaches the highest stage? At this point it appears that the 
hierarchy cannot continue to exist in the form that it has previously. 
It seems a logical necessity that something else must happen. 
Eventually even Kohlberg himself comes to that conclusion. or seems 
to (Kohlberg. 1984). For one thing he talks about soft stage 
development in adulthood. The following quotation describes the role of 
soft stages: 
There are hierarchical levels of positive development in 
adulthood and this development is something other than life 
phases (Levinson. 1978). In addition we should note that the 
soft stages of the sort described here differ from Erikson's 
functional stages. Soft stage development depends neither on 
the emergence of new functions nor on the performance of new 
tasks. Instead. soft stage development depends on formal re-
flection. Models of soft stage development describe the 
adult's attempt to interpret the task of metaphysics and 
religion. the task of integrating the ideals of justice. love. 
and truth with one's understanding of the ultimate nature of 
reality (Kohlberg. 1984. pp. 40-41). 
In addition to this. Kohlberg has collaborated with Richard Shulik 
to suggest that two types of post-conventional development are possible 
(Kohlberg. in press). After attaining Stage 5 moral reasoning. the 
individual may either progress to Stage 6 at which rational justice is 
the prime concern. or he may depart the stage structure altogether and 
adopt an ethic of agape (putting the other before the self; Kohlberg. 
1985). 
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The general consensus of all the literature presented here is that 
there is something qualitatively different about adult development. As 
an individual matures and begins to approach the upper stages of moral 
reasoning. something other than a simple step-by-step progression 
through the stages begins to take place. It is the contention of this 
author that this other process is a narrowing of the gaps between 
spontaneous use. comprehension. and preference. There has been very 
little research in this area. but one study that hints at this process 
was conducted by Carroll and Rest (1981). In looking for advances in 
moral reasoning among high school students (seventh. ninth and eleventh 
graders). they focused on rejection of lower-stage reasoning rather than 
acceptance of higher-stage reasoning. Their finding was that this re-
jection of lower-stage reasoning by an individual could actually be a 
better indicator of moral development than acceptance of higher stages. 
As they said. 
When individuals give up thinking at stages lower than their 
modal stage. this can be viewed as developmental advance in 
the sense of consolidation at the higher stage. Progress need 
not be thought of solely as the acquisition of new forms of 
thought (Carroll & Rest. 1981. p. 543). 
This takes on special meaning when applied to the higher stages of 
development and does logically suggest a narrowing of the gaps. If one 
has reached the highest stage of moral reasoning. then there are theo-
retically no new forms of thought and any development .that is to take 
place would have to be, as Carroll and Rest call it. a "consolidation at 
the higher stage." In the terminology of the hierarchy again. if pre-
ference has no higher stage into which to advance. then any advance in 
spontaneous use or comprehension would have to result in a narrowing of 
the distance between the three measures of moral reasoning. 
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The only study located in this review of literature to directly 
address this relationship clearly found this to be the case. Pratt, 
Golding, and Hunter (1983) administered Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Inter-
view (a measure of spontaneous use) and Rest's Defining Issues Test (a 
measure of preference) to three groups of subjects aged 18-24, 30-50, 
and 60-85. For the youngest group there was no correlation between the 
two measures. for the middle-aged group the correlation was .37, and for 
the older group the correlation was .70 (p < .01). This would appear to 
be a very clear indication that as individuals get older there becomes 
less and less difference between their preference for the ideal moral 
reasoning and the reasoning which they spontaneously use. 
The importance of this finding for moral motivation is seen when 
the study is viewed in the light of the third component of Rest's four-
component model of morality. As previously mentioned, Component 3 is 
the point in the moral decision-making process at which non-moral 
factors may pre-empt or compromise the individual's moral ideals. It 
appears from the Pratt, et al. (1983) study that age (a non-moral 
factor) has a definite effect here. As individuals grow older they 
apparently become much less likely to allow any preemption or com-
promise, and instead they tend to choose actions more nearly in accord 
with their moral ideals than they did at earlier ages. 
In summary, the overall thrust of this section has been to suggest 
that there is a qualitative difference in the way moral development 
proceeds for adults as opposed to children. It is proposed that this 
difference is a narrowing of the gaps between spontaneous use, com-
prehension, and preference, and research, particularly Pratt et al. 
(1983); would appear to support this idea. It is these gaps which are 
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the focus of this study. regarding both their relationship to age and to 
the other variables which will be discussed in the following section. 
Other Variables 
s~ 
Research on sex differences in moral reasoning is not altogether 
conclusive. In addition to the fact that many studies have shown dif-
ferences between the sexes and many have not. there is also the problem 
of determining whether these differences are actually the result of 
different moral reasoning processes for males and females or whether 
they can be explained by differences in education or occupation. 
In a study for the National Institute of Education. Gilligan et al. 
(1982). working with a sample of 14 males and 16 females ranging in age 
from 8 to 60+. found that 75 percent of females chose considerations of 
care rather than consideration of justice in dealing with real-life 
moral dilemmas. Only 14 percent of the males in the sample chose con-
siderations of care. and this difference was found to be significant at 
the .001 level. These results are used to suggest that the moral rea-
soning process for women is different than it is for men; however. it is 
interesting to note that this study also found a mean Moral Maturity 
Score (MMS) for men of 413 (on the Moral Judgment Interview) as opposed 
to a mean of 400 for women. This difference was not found to be sta-
tistically significant. Although an alternative method of comparison 
based upon individual judgments in the interview rather than overall 
scores found a significant difference (p <0.25). this procedure has been 
called into question by other researchers (Kohlberg. 1984). 
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One study that did show a statistically significant difference 
between sexes was done by Holstein (1976). Using a sample of 53 adult 
males and their wives. Holstein found mean MMS of 408.65 for men and 
366.06 for women. This difference was found to be significant at the 
.001 level. A retest three years later showed that males still tended 
to show higher MMS (409.67 to 393.82) but the difference was no longer 
significant. Holstein suggests that these differences may be due to the 
fact that Kohlberg's stages were originally defined and empirically 
tested on an all-male sample. and that as a result of this. emotional 
responses to moral conflict which are more common in females than males 
tend to cause adult female reasoning to be scored at lower stages than 
adult male reasoning. 
On the other side of the coin. other studies have looked for sex 
differences in moral reasoning and found none. With·a sample of 37 male 
and 41 female subjects (ages 21 to 39). Weisbroth (1970) found mean MMS 
of 421 for men and 409 for women which was not significant. In summa-
rizing result of 21 different studies using the Defining Issues Test. 
Rest (1979) notes that only 2 found significant sex differences and in 
both of those the difference favored females. 
All of these findings are presented here to show that there does 
not seem to be a clear indication of whether there are actually any 
differences between the sexes or not. Given this. the present study 
will certainly not prove anything conclusively. but will only add 
support to one side of the discussion or the other. However. by looking 
at levels of spontaneous use. comprehension. and preference. the study 
should be able to suggest whether or not observed sex differences are 
actually differences in over all moral reasoning. or whether they are 
specific to any one measure of moral reasoning. 
Locus of Control 
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This variable will be included mainly on theoretical grounds. Con-
sidering the nature of the moral hierarchy being studied. it seems 
logical to assume that an individual who shows only small differences 
between the three measures of moral reasoning and who is. therefore. 
highly resistant to compromise of his moral ideals. is also fairly 
resistant to the influences of other people in general. Thus. small 
differences are expected to correlate with internal locus of control. 
In addition. there is some research to support the idea of a rela-
tionship between moral development and locus of control. In one study 
of middle-school students. Richard Prawat (1976) found a significant 
positive correlation between locus of control as measured by the Bialer 
Locus of Control Scale (Bialer. 1961). and moral development measured by 
the Defining Issues Test (Rest. 1974). but only among the female stu-
dents. Another study (Lambert. DeJulio. and Cole. 1976) using under-
graduate students as subjects employed both the Defining Issues Test and 
two locus of control measures: the I scale of the Personal Orienta-
tion Inventory (Shostrom. 1964) and Rotter's I-E scale (Rotter. 1966). 
In this study the correlation of the principled level of moral reason-
ing (Stages 5 and 6) to locus of control on the POI was found to be .34 
which was significant at the .01 level. However. the correlation to the 
I-E scale was virtually non-existent (.01). These conflicting results 
would certainly suggest that the relationship between moral reasoning 
and locus of control bears further study. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the review of the literature. the following hypotheses 
were formulated: 
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1. There is a significant relationship between spontaneous use of 
moral stage reasoning and a set of variables including age, sex. and 
locus of control. 
2. There is a significant relationship between comprehension of 
moral stage reasoning and a set of variables including age. sex. and 
locus of control. 
3. There is a significant relationship between preference for 
moral stage reasoning and a set of variables including age, sex. and 




The purpose of this chapter is to describe how the study was 
conducted. This description addresses four general areas.: subjects. 
instruments. procedures. and statistical analysis. The subjects section 
describes general characteristics (age. sex. education. etc.) of the 
individuals involved in the study and discusses to what extent these 
characteristics make the sample representative of a larger population. 
Instruments used in the study are described in terms of general format 
and means of administration. Current reliability and validity 
., 
informationare also presented. The procedures section includes the 
method in which the testing was conducted as well as a brief description 
of the scoring procedures. The statistical method used in this study is 
presented along with the rationale for using this particular method. 
Subjects 
The sample used in this study was selected with the intent of 
generalizing to the widest possible population. There were. however. 
limitations imposed by both geography and by theory that should be 
mentioned. For one thing. the sample consisted entirely of American 
citizens or persons raised in the United States. This was done to 
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eliminate the cultural differences that might be present in a multi-
national sample. 
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Secondly, with Rest's (1978) finding of a significant relationship 
between educational level and moral reasoning in mind, all subjects were 
college graduates. This was done in an attempt to avoid confounding 
educational level with the other variables being examined. The target 
population was thus considered to be college-educated, American adults. 
Particular characteristics of the sample and the degree to which it is 
representative of the population are presented in the Discussion section 
of this paper. 
The sample consisted of 100 subjects--10 males and 10 females in 
each of the following age groups: 22-32, 33-43. 44-54. 55-65. 66 and 
older. Using alpha level (.05), the number of independent variables 
(3). and assuming a medium effect size (f2 = .15), this sample size 
yields a power of .91 (Cohen, 1977) which would appear to be sufficient. 
Subjects were recruited from university faculty, professional 
organizations, alumni associations, civic groups, and church groups and 
participated on a volunteer basis. More complete information regarding 
subjects can be found in Appendix E. Although no geographical 
boundaries were intended. practicality dictated that nearly all subjects 
were from the midwestern United States. All subjects were assured 




Standard Moral Judgment Interview 
The Standard Moral Judgment Interview (Colby & Kohlberg. in press) 
was used as a measure of spontaneous use of moral reasoning. The 
purpose of this instrument according to its authors is: 
••• to elicit the subject's own construction of moral rea-
soning. his or her moral frame of reference or assumptions 
about right and wrong. and the way that s/he uses these be-
liefs and assumptions to make and justify moral deci-
sions ••• The questions asked are explicitly prescriptive in 
order to elicit normative judgments about what one should do 
rather than descriptive or predictive judgments about what one 
would do (Colby & Kohlberg. in press. p. 105). 
The interview consists of three dilemmas or stories which are de-
signed to pose a conflict between two moral issues. After hearing each 
dilemma. the subject responds to a series of questions. the intent of 
which is to elicit not only the individual's judgment about the issues 
involved but also about the norms and values employed in reaching that 
judgment. The responses are then categorized by issues. norms. and 
value elements and assigned a stage score within Kohlberg's stage 
structure (i.e. Stage Three. Stage Four. etc.). The overall score for 
the test can then be reported one of two ways. One is the Global Stage 
Score which is simply the subject's modal stage. the stage at which he 
has responded most often throughout the test. The other method involves 
combining the subject's responses from all stages to yield a Weighted 
Average Score (WAS). The WAS was used for this study mainly because it 
provides a continuous measure rather than discrete stage scores. 
The authors report the test-retest reliability of the interview as 
ranging from .96 to .99 for a variety of raters. inter-rater reliability 
39 
as .98, and internal consistency ranging from .92 to .96 (Colby & Kohl-
berg. in press). 
In addressing the validity of the instrument, the authors contend 
that the appropriate concern for an instrument of this type is constuct 
validity (Colby & Kohlberg. in press). Considering that what a person 
says he should do and what he actually does may not be the same, they 
suggest that the focus should not be on whether the instrument predicts 
behavior, but on whether it supports the developmental assumptions of 
the theory, namely invariance of stage structure and structural 
wholeness or generality of stage usage across moral issues. They cite a 
variety of studies (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Erickson, 
1980; Gilligan & Murphy, 1979; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey, Kohlberg, 
& Reimer, 1984) in an attempt to support these assumptions, but perhaps 
the most important thing that can be said about the instrument's valid-
ity is that its widespread approval and use (Alston, 1971; Locke, 1979; 
Mischel & Mischel, 1976; Rest, 1973 to name a few) have indicated a con-
sensus among experts that it does. in fact, possess construct validity. 
Comprehension of Social-Moral Issues Test 
The Comprehension of Social-Moral Issues Test (Rest, Cooper, Coder, 
Masanz. & Anderson, 1974) will be used as a measure of comprehension. 
This instrument consists of ten paragraphs each of which advances some 
type of moral argument. After each paragraph, the subject is asked to 
select from a group of four statements the one which best represents the 
meaning of the paragraph. It should be noted that this has nothing to 
do with the subject's own level of moral reasoning or his own agreement 
or disagreement with the argument presented in the paragraph. It is 
'' III~IIIQIII•• 
simply intended to check whether or not the subject understands the 
argument. The score reported for this test is simply the number of 
correct choices. 
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Reliability figures reported by the authors (Rest, et al •• 1974) 
show a test-retest reliability of .51 for a sample of 24 ninth-graders. 
which is quite poor. For the purposes of this study, new reliability 
figures were calculated in the hope that more acceptable test-retest 
reliability could be shown. A random sample of the subjects were re-
tested two weeks after the initial testing. One male and one female 
were randomly selected from each of the five age groups to participate 
in this re-testing. For this sample group of ten subjects, test-retest 
reliability was calculated to be .70. 
The only validity information available is the expert judgment of 
a group of graduate students in political science and moral philosophy. 
Their collective opinion was used to determine the correct choice for 
each paragraph (Rest, et al •• 1974). 
Defining Issues Test 
The Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979) will be used in this study as 
a measure of preference of moral stage reasoning. The major differences 
in this instrument as compared to the other two are that unlike the 
Kohlberg interview it does not require the production of moral reason-
ing. and unlike the comprehension test it does require a judgment as to 
what issues should be the basis for a moral decision. The test consists 
of six moral dilemmas presented in written form. Each of these is 
followed by twelve questions or statements designed to address issues 
which may or may not be important in making a decision about that 
particular dilemma. The subject is asked first of all to make a 
decision about how to resolve the dilemma and then to rate the twelve 
issues on a five-point scale of their importance (great, much, some. 
little, no) to the subject's decision. In addition, the subject is 
asked to rank his four most important issues in order from most impor-
tant to least important. 
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There are two scores that can be reported for the DIT. One is the 
P score which is simply the percentage of the subject's responses made 
at the Stage Five and Stage Six levels of moral reasoning. The other 
score is the D score which is a weighted index of responses at all 
stages and which is similar to the WAS for the Standard Moral Judgment 
Interview. In most cases there are significant differences between the 
P and D scores only in adolescent or younger subjects. Therefore, 
considering the age range in this study, only the P score was used. 
In addition. there are two checks of subject reliability built into 
the DIT. These are the M score which measures the extent to which the 
subject tends to select complex but intentionally meaningless test 
items, and the Consistency Check which measures the extent to which the 
subject is inconsistent in the way he responds to test items. Either an 
excessively high M score or a failure on the Consistency Check are 
grounds to invalidate the subjects test score; however, the author 
suggests (Rest. 1979) that results be reported for purged (invalid 
scores removed) and unpurged samples. The results of this study are 
therefore presented both ways. 
The reliability of the DIT would appear to be within the acceptable 
range. Davison (1979), in a study combining the results of seven 
different sample groups. reports an internal consistency of .79 and 
test-retest reliability ranging from .67 to .92 for the different 
sample groups. 
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In discussing the validity of the instrument. Rest (1979) points 
out the same problem mentioned by Colby and Kohlberg (1984). For tests 
of moral judgment there is no clear-cut set of behaviors which moral 
judgment can be expected to predict. He suggests that a variety of 
criteria must be used in establishing validity and lists seven that were 
considered in regard to the DIT. They are briefly summarized here as 
follows. 
1. Face validity. In addition to the fact that the DIT deals 
specifically with moral issues. it also is directly concerned with the 
processes of moral decision-making and the ordering of different stages 
of reasoning--all of which is relevent to face validity. 
2. Psychometric reliability. The DIT appears to be internally 
consistent. to have no problems with inter-rater reliability due to its 
objective scoring. and to be stable over short periods of time (Davison. 
1979). 
3. Criterion group validity. The DIT has been shown to differen-
tiate between groups of individuals that could theoretically be expected 
to differ regarding moral reasoning. Using a group of doctoral students 
in moral philosophy and political science as an expert group. Rest has 
shown a significant difference between their levels of moral reasoning 
(as measured by the DIT) as opposed to that of ninth-graders (Rest. 
1979). 
4. Longitudinal validity. Longitudinal studies have shown signif-
icant upward trends in moral reasoning over a four-year period and over 
a six-year period (Rest. 1979). Individual patterns of change also show 
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an upward trend in that 65% of the subjects show upward movement over a 
four-year period while only 7% move downward (Rest. 1979). 
5. Convergent-Divergent validity. The DIT shows strong correla-
tions to other measures which might be expected to be similar such as 
Kohlberg's test and the Comprehension of Social-Moral Issues Test with 
correlations in the .60's and .70's and lesser correlations to other 
cognitive development measures--.20's to .SO's. averaging .36 (Rest. 
1979). 
6. Validation through experimental enhancement studies. Interven-
tion studies have shown that the DIT does appear to measure a distinct 
domain. In particular. Panowitsch and Balkcum (1976) have shown that 
participation in a logic class facilitated upward movement by subjects 
in measures of logic but not in DIT scores. while participation in an 
ethics class facilitated upward movement on DIT scores but not in logic. 
7. Validation through experimental manipulation of test-taking 
sets. Studies have suggested that the DIT does represent subjects' best 
notions of the highest principles of justice. For example. McGeorge 
(1975) asked one group of subjects to "fake good" in responding to the 
DIT and another group to "fake bad." Compared to scores obtained under 
normal conditions. the fake bad group scores were lower than the normal 
scores and the fake good group scores were no different. 
Rotter's I-E Scale 
The I-E Scale (Rotter. 1966) was used as a measure of locus of 
control. The test consists of 29 A-B choice items and include 6 filler 
items intended to make the purpose of the test more ambiguous. For each 
item pair. one response indicates a belief in external control and the 
other indicates a belief in internal control. The score is the total 
number of the external choices. 
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Rotter (1966) reports Kuder-Richardson consistency estimates 
ranging from .69 to .73 for a variety of different samples. These would 
appear to be within the acceptable range as are the test-retest 
reliability figures. For samples of university students in psychology 
and reformatory inmates. the instrument has shown test-retest reli-
ability of .72 and .78 respectively over a one-month period. 
With respect to the construct validity of the instrument. Rotter 
(1966) cites a variety of studies which suggest that individuals who are 
highly internal tend to (a) be more alert to aspects of their environ-
ments which provide useful information for future behavior. (b) act in 
ways which improve their environmental conditions. and (c) place greater 
value on skill and achievement reinforcements than external subjects. 
Of particular interest for the present study are results reported by 
Strickland (1962) and Getter (1962) which suggest that internal individ-
uals are more resistant to subtle suggestion than external individuals. 
This appears to be further evidence to suggest that internal subjects 
would be less likely to allow their moral values to be "compromised or 
preempted" (Rest. 1984. p. 36). 
Procedures 
Whenever possible the instruments were administered in a group 
setting. however. serious scheduling difficulties necessitated that most 
testing sessions involved only one subject. Testing took place either 
at the office of this author or the home of the subject. The author was 
present during testing of 71 of the subjects; however. due to the length 
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of the tests. 29 subjects were allowed to take the test packet home and 
return it when completed. In these cases. the subjects were cautioned 
not to discuss the tests with anyone and. if possible. to complete them 
in one sitting. All testing was completed between September 1985 and 
October 1986 and the subject's age as reported in this study indicates 
his/her age as of the testing date. Sex was dummy-coded using 0 for 
males and 1 for females. The subjects were each given a packet 
containing all four instruments: the Standard Moral Judgment Interview. 
the Comprehension of Social-Moral Issues Test. the Defining Issues Test. 
and Rotter's I-E Scales. and the Informed Consent Form. They were then 
asked to read the written instructions printed on each test. complete 
the tests in writing. read and sign the enclosed consent form and return 
the entire packet to this author. 
Scoring of each of the individual instruments was accomplished as 
follows: 
1. Moral Judgment Interview. The written responses were 
interpreted by this author and scored according to the testing 
manual (Colby and Kohlberg. in press). At the time of 
scoring. this author was blind as to age. sex. and all other 
test scores. 
2. Comprehension of Social-Moral Issues Test. This is an objec-
tively scored. multiple-choice test scored by this author. 
3. Defining Issues Test. These tests were objectively scored by 
this author according to procedures provided in the test 
manual (Rest. 1979). 
4. Rotter's I-E Scale. This is an objectively scored. forced-
choice test scored by this author. 
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Statistical Analysis 
The data collected in this study were analyzed by means of multiple 
regression using the subprogram REGRESSION of the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSSx User's Guide. New York. 1983). This 
approach would appear to be appropriate for this study in that it 
"allows the researcher to study the linear relationship between a set of 
independent variables and a dependent variable while taking into account 
the interrelationships among the independent variables" (Nie. Hull. 
Jenkins. Steinbrenner. and Bent. 1975. p. 8). A separate analysis was 
conducted for each of the three dependent measures (spontaneous use. 
comprehension. and preference) determining the relationship between each 
one and a linear combination of the independent variables (age. sex. and 
locus of control). 
In each of the three analyses. the forward (stepwise) inclusion 
approach was used in which "the order of inclusion of independent 
variables is determined by the respective contribution of each variable 
to explained variance" (Nie. et al.. 1975. p. 345). This. again. would 
appear to be appropriate in that there did not appear from research to 
be any clear indication that any one of the independent variables should 
be expected to explain the greater part of the variance in the dependent 
measures. For the Moral Judgment Interview and the Defining Issues 
' Test. there have been conflicting results regarding their relationship 
to the independent variables. particularly with regard to sex as 
reported in Chapter Two. and for the Comprehension of Social-Moral 
Issues Test. the relationships have simply not been widely studied. 
Summary 
This chapter has considered the design and methodology used in 
completing this study. discussing particularly the subjects. the 
instruments used. the testing procedures. and the statistical analysis. 
Chapter Four presents the findings of the study. the analysis of 
the data. and the relationships of this·data to the hypotheses stated 
earlier. 
Chapter Five discusses the research findings and relates them to 
the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Two. Practical signifi-






The results of the study along with the statistical analysis of 
those results are presented in this chapter. The major emphasis of the 
study is to determine if any or all of the independent variables. age. 
sex. and locus of control. or any of the interactions among those 
variables. can account for a significant portion of the variance in 
scores on the three measures of moral reasoning for the sample group. 
Each hypothesis was tested using the REGRESSION sub-program of the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSSx User's Guide. New 
York. 1983). 
Intercorrelation of Variables 
As an initial step in investigating the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent measures. a Pearson correlation 
matrix was constructed. The correlation coefficients and their levels 
of significance are included in Table III. Further discussion of these 
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TABLE III 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Comprehension Preference Age Sex 
.46*** .44*** -.22* -.27** 













Test of Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One 
This hypothesis states that there is a significant relationship 
between spontaneous use of moral stage reasoning and the set of 
variables including age. sex. and locus of control. Spontaneous use was 
measured by the Standard Moral Judgment Interview. The scoring method 
used involved combining the subject's responses from all stages to yield 
a Weighted Average Score (WAS). The WAS was used for this study because 
it provides a continuous measure rather than discrete stage scores. 
A multiple R of .27 was obtained between spontaneous use and the 
set of independent variables which was significant (p < .01). Indi-
vidually. the most important of the independent variables in terms of 
accounting for variance in spontaneous use scores was found to be sex 
with an r of -.27 and an F of 7.67. both of which were significant 
(p < .01). With sex entered first into the regression equation. the 
addition of age as the next most important variable yielded a multiple R 
of .36. This was a significant increase (p ::_ .05) and thus age also 
appears to account for a significant portion of variance in spontaneous 
use. The addition of locus of control provided only a small increase in 
the multiple R which was not significant. However. with all three 
variables entered into the equation. the overall F value of 4.93 was 
significant at the .01 level. None of the interactions among the 
independent variables were found to be significant. Hypothesis one was 
supported by the data. A summary of the regression analysis is provided 
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TABLE IV 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS SUMMARY FOR SPONTANEOUS USE 
R2 
% of Variance 2 ' 
R Accounted For R change 
.26935 • 07255 7.3 • 07255** 
.35916 .12899 12.9 .05645* 
.36537 .13349 13.3 .00450 
• 37262 .13885 13.9 .00536 
.37652 .14177 14.2 .00292 
.39517 .15616 15.6 .01439 













This hypothesis states that there is a significant relationship 
between comprehension of moral stage reasoning and a set of variables 
including age, sex, and locus of control. Comprehension was measured by 
the Comprehension of Social-Moral Issues Test. 
A multiple R of .36 was obtained between comprehension and the set 
of independent variables which was significant (p ~ .01). However, only 
one of the variables. age. was found to account for a significant 
portion of the variance in comprehension scores on its own. The contri-
butions of sex. locus of control and the interactions were not 
significant. As a group. though. with all three variables entered into 
the equation. the overall F of 4.66 was significant at the .01 level. 
Hypothesis two was supported by the data. A summary of the regression 
analysis is provided in Table V. 
Hypothesis Three 
This hypothesis states that there is a significant relationship 
between preference for moral stage reasoning and a set of variables 
including age. sex, and locus of control. Preference was measured by 
the P score on the Defining Issues Test which is simply the percentage 
of the subject's responses made at the Stage 5 and Stage 6 levels of 
moral reasoning. As the author of the test suggests (Rest. 1979). 
results are reported for both purged (invalid scores removed) and 
unpurged samples. 
With all scores included (N = 100) a multiple R of .32 was obtained 
between DIT scores and the set of independent variables which was 
significant (p < .05). Again. as with hypothesis two. only age was 
TABLE V 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS SUMMARY FOR COMPREHENSION 
Independent 
R2 
% Of Variance 2 Overall 
Variable R Accounted For R change F 
Age .33137 .10981 11.0 .10981*** 12.08871*** 
Locus of Control .34133 .11650 11.7 .00670 6.39558** 
Sex .35668 .12722 12.7 .01072 4.66458** 
Age x Sex .35673 .12725 12.7 .00003 3.46298* 
Age>< 
Locus of Control .39126 .15308 15.3 .02583 J 3.39821** 
Sex x 
Locus of Control .41496 .17219 17.2 .01910 3.22407** 
Age x Sex x 
Locus of Control .41510 .17231 17.2 .00012 2.73607* 
N = 100 
*.E. 2. . 05 
**.E. 2.. 01 




found to explain a significant portion of the variance in DIT scores. 
The contributions of sex. locus of control and the interactions were not 
significant. However, with all three variables entered into the 
regression equation. the overall F of 3.60 was still significant at the 
.05 level. A summary of the regression analysis is provided in 
Table VI. 
There were twelve subjects whose tests failed to meet either the M 
score or Consistency Check criteria and thus were invalidated. With 
those twelve scores removed, a separate regression analysis was 
performed on the purged sample (N = 88). The results differed only 
slightly from the complete sample. Again, significance was found for 
all three variables as a group and for age individually, but not for 
sex, locus of control or any of the interactions. A summary of this 
analysis is provided in Table VII. Since the overall F with all three 
variables entered were found to be significant for both the purged and 
unpurged samples, hypothesis three was supported by the data. 
Summary 
The Pearson Correlation matrix indicates that age was significantly 
related to all three of the measures of moral reasoning while sex was 
related only to spontaneous use. Locus of control was not related to 
any of the dependent variables, but was significantly related to both 
age and sex. All three of the moral reasoning measures were 
significantly related to each other. 
The regression analyses indicated that there were significant rela-
tionships between each of the measures of moral reasoning and the set of 
independent variables. Individually. age and sex were found to account 
TABLE VI 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR PREFERENCE-UNPURGED SAMPLE 
Independent 
R2 
% Of Variance 
2 Variable R Accounted For R change 
Age .28674 .08222 8.2 .08222** 
Locus of Control .30852 .09519 9.5 .01296 
Sex .31795 .10109 10.1 .00590 
Age x Sex .31829 .10131 10.1 .00022 
Age x 
Locus of Control .33829 . 11444 11.4 • 01313 
Sex x 
Locus of Control .35016 .11261 12.3 .00817 
Age x Sex x 
Locus of Control .35202 .12392 12.3 .00131 
N = 100 
*.E. ~. 05 













SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR PREFERENCE - PURGED SAMPLE 
Independent 
R2 
% Of Variance 2 
Variable R Accounted For R change 
Age .27114 .07352 7.4 .07352* 
Locus of Control .29078 .08455 . 8.5 .01104 
Sex .30798 .09485 9.5 .01030 
Age x Sex .32103 .10306 10.3 .00821 
Age x 
Locus of Control .36679 .13453 13.5 .03147 
Sex x 
Locus of Control .37342 .13944 13.9 .00491 
Age x Sex x 
Locus of Control .37365 .13962 14.0 .00017 
N = 88 













for significant portions of the variance in spontaneous use. while only 
age accounted for a significant portion of the variance in comprehension 
and preference. All three hypotheses were supported by the data. 
DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
Presented in this chapter is a discussion of the results of this 
study dealing with both the statistical significance and the practical 
significance of the findings. This discussion deals. first of all. with 
each of the independent variables and their relationships to the 
dependent measures. Also presented are the theoretical implications of 
the study including the importance of the results to the hierarchy of 
moral reasoning described in Chapter Two. and the contribution of the 
results to a general theory of moral motivation. Finally the chapter 
includes recommendations. both procedural recommendations for similar 
research and suggestions for further studies. 
Age 
Of the three independent variables included in this study. age 
clearly showed the strongest relationship to moral reasoning. This. in 
itself. is not especially noteworthy. but what is rather surprising is 
that the relationship is negative. and that it is consistent across all 
three measures of moral reasoning. Within this group of subjects. the 
older subjects spontaneously used. comprehended. and preferred lower 





to what would normally be expected. Given the available research 
(Rest. 1978).(moral reasoning could be expected to 
childhood and adolescence and remain fairly stable 
increase throughout 
throughout adulthood~ 
Even if some other processes are taking place in adulthood such as 
increasing cognitive skills (Mischel & Mischel. 1976). or meta-ethical 
reflection (Gibbs. 1977; Murphy & Gilligan. 1980). or soft stage 
development (Kohlberg. et al •• 1984). none of these would lead one to 
expect a decrease in levels of moral reasoning. If anything. there 
should be an increase. and yet the data clearly show the opposite. 
This unusual finding is tempered somewhat by the fact that this was 
a cross-sectional study rather than a longitudinal one. There is. of 
course. no evidence that the moral reasoning of the older subjects was 
ever any higher than it is now. or that the moral reasoning of the 
younger subjects will go down as time passes. Nevertheless. some 
attempt at explantion is in order. One possibility is suggested by 
looking at the mean scores on the moral reasoning measures for each of 
the five age groups as presented in Figures 1 - 3 and Tables VIII - X. 
On all three of the tests. the highest mean score was in the 33-43 age 
group. and the lowest was in the 66+ age group. These unexpected peaks 
in the 33-43 age group suggest that some sort of change in moral 
reasoning may be taking place at this point in a person's life. 
It is possible that something like the cognitive shifts described 
by Murphy and Gilligan (1980) may account for this change. As a child 
grows up. his increases in levels of moral reasoning may be due mainly 
to increases in cognitive ability; he becomes more capable of under-
standing the complexities involved in moral issues. and thus his moral 





























22-32 33-43 44-54 55-65 66+ 
AGE GROUPS 
Figure 1. Moral Judgment Interview Mean Scores 
TABLE VIII 
AGE GROUP MEANS FOR THE MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEW 
22-32 
368.20 
n = 20 
33-43 
382.00 
n = 20 
44-54 
370.05 
n = 20 
55-65 
368.15 
n = 20 
66+ 
349.70 
n = 20 
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22-32 33-43 44-54 55-65 66+ 
AGE GROUPS 
Figure 2. Comprehension Test Mean Scores 
22-32 
6.55 
n = 20 
TABLE IX 
AGE GROUP MEANS FOR THE COMPREHENSION 
OF SOCIAL-MORAL ISSUES TEST 
33-43 
7.60 
n = 20 
44-54 
6.25 
n = 20 
55-65 
5.90 
n = 20 
66+ 
4.95 
















22-32 33-43 44-54 55-65 66+ 
AGE GROUPS 
Figure 3. Defining Issues Test Mean Scores 
TABLE X 
AGE GROUP MEANS FOR THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST 
22-32 
39.84 
n = 20 
33-43 
46.75 
n = 20 
44-54 
40. 17 
n = 20 
55-65 
33.41 
n = 20 
66+ 
31.92 
n = 20 
62 
63 
apparently. this process cannot go on forever. Several researchers 
(Coder. 1975; Kohlberg and Shulik. in press; Rest. 1973) suggest that 
adult moral development is more determined by personal experience than 
by increases in cognitive ability. If that is. in fact. the case. this 
study would indicate that it may be somewhere between the ages of 33 and 
43 that personal experience begins to become more important than 
cognitive ability in making moral judgments. Moral reasoning in later 
life. then. may not actually be regressing. but changing--moving outside 
of the stage structure. including more than just cognitive judgments 
about justice. 
So while all three measures of moral reasoning used in this study 
show a quantitative change with age (decrease in scores). they may be 
failing to show a qualitative change that is actually taking place. 
This change may possibly be due to meta-ethical reflection (Gibbs. 1977) 
or soft-stage development (Kohlberg. 1984). or an ethic of agape 
(Kohlberg and Shulik. in press). Whatever the specific process may be. 
something does appear to be happening in the 33-43 age range that 
clearly warrants further study. 
Sex 
The only measure of moral reasoning to show a significant relation-
ship to sex was Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview. In this case. 
given the method of dummy-coding (males = 0 and females = 1). the 
negative relationship (r = -.27. E = .003) is indicative of 
significantly higher scores for men than for women. The mean scores for 
the age groups as presented in Figure 4 and Table XI show that males' 
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44-54 55-65 66+ 
AGE GROUPS 
Figure 4. Moral Judgment Interview Mean Scores 
TABLE XI 
MALE/FEMALE AGE GROUP MEANS FOR THE 
MORAL JUDGMENT INTERVIEW 
22-32 33-43 44-54 55-65 ·66+ 
382.2 391.1 378.9 384.1 349.6 
n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 
354.2 372.9 361.2 352.2 349.8 




n = 50 
358.06 
n = 50 
then were only very slightly smaller. Overall. the mean WAS for males 
was 377.18 while for females it was 358.06. 
65 
This finding would appear to lend support to the Gilligan et al. 
(1982) argument that women are more likely to make moral judgments based 
on something other than an ethic of justice. Kohlberg's stages as 
measured by the Moral Judgment Interview are based on justice (Kohlberg. 
1984) and with this as a measure of moral reasoning, women clearly did 
not do as well as men. Although this study does not provide any 
evidence as to what accounts for this difference in scores between males 
and females such as an orientation toward care rather than toward 
justice (Gilligan et al., 1982). it does suggest that there definitely 
is a difference between the moral reasoning of men and women that bears 
further investigation. 
No significant relationships were found between sex and 
comprehension or preference. This would seem to be in keeping with the 
literature (Rest, 1979) that reports that sex differences are not 
generally found on the DIT. Age group mean scores for comprehension and 
preference are presented in Figures 5 and 6 and in Tables XII and XIII. 
Locus of Control 
For practical purposes there does not appear to be any relation-
ship between locus of control and moral reasoning since the correlations 
reported in Table III range from .03 to -.03. Apparently the degree to 
which an individual believes the controlling factors in his life to be 
internal or external has nothing to do with how he or she makes moral 
judgments. This is in keeping with the Lambert, Dejulio. and Cole 
(1976) findings. There were, however. significant relationships between 
10 
9 
en ex: 8 
IZl 




















/ ' (female)/ " / ' 
22-32 33-43 44-54 55-65 66+ 
AGE GROUPS 
Figure s. Comprehension Test Mean Scores 
TABLE XII 
MALE/FEMALE AGE GROUP MEANS FOR THE COMPREHENSION 
OF SOCIAL-MORAL ISSUES TEST 
22-32 33-43 44-54 55-65 66+ 
6.7 6.9 6.1 5.6 4.8 
n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 
6.4 8.3 6.4 6.2 5. 1 




n = 50 
6.48 

























22-32 33-43 44-54 
AGE GROUPS 
55-65 66+ 
Figure 6. Defining Issues Test Mean Scores 
TABLE XIII 
MALE/FEMALE AGE GROUP MEANS FOR THE 
DEFINING ISSUES TEST 
22-32 33-43 44-54 55-65 66+ 
42.82 43.33 39.18 40.99 31.17 
n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 n = 10 
36.85 50.17 41.16 25.82 32.67 
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22-32 33-43 44-54 55-65 66+ 
AGE GROUPS 
Figure 7. Locus of Control Mean Scores 
22-32 
8.6 
n = 10 
11.0 
n = 10 
TABLE XIV 
MALE/FEMALE AGE GROUP MEANS FOR 
ROTTER'S I-E SCALE 
33-43 
7.4 
n = 10 
6.7 
n = 10 
44-54 
6.4 
n = 10 
7.9 
n = 10 
55-65 
5.6 
n = 10 
6.7 
n = 10 
66+ 
4.5 
n = 10 
7.3 




n = 50 
7 .92. 
n = 50 
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locus of control and both age and sex. The data as presented in Figure 
7 and Table XIV indicate that the older subjects tended to be more 
internal than the younger subjects. and that men tended to be more 
internal than women. The main reason for including locus of control in 
this study was the idea that increasing internality with age. which was 
expected. would be indicative of increasing consistency between moral 
reasoning measures with age as well. However. as the next section 
indicates. this does not appear to be the case. 
Theoretical Implications 
One of the major concerns of this study was to look at the 
hierarchical nature of spontaneous use. comprehension, and preference. 
and to examine how that hierarchy changed with age. The expectation. as 
presented in Chapter Two. was that as age increased. the "gaps" between 
the three moral reasoning measures would decrease. Even though an 
individual may always show a difference between levels of spontaneous 
use and preference. that difference would become smalle~ as the 
individual got older. Unfortunately. this study does not provide much 
support for that theory. Given the previously cited Pratt. Golding. and 
Hunter (1983) finding. this is somewhat surprising. That study shows a 
very definite increase in correlations between spontaneous use and 
preference with age. But as Table XV indicates. that increase is not 
apparent in this study. 
To make a truly definitive statement about the changing relation-
ship between these moral reasoning measures would probably require more 
than twenty subjects per age group. but these results are not especially 
22-32 
.24 
n = 20 
p = .16 
TABLE XV 
CORRELATION BETWEEN SPONTANEOUS USE AND 
PREFERENCE BY AGE GROUP 
33-43 
.42 
n = 20 
p = .03 
44-54 
. 01 
n = 20 
p = .40 
55-65 
.78 
n = 20 
p = .001 
66+ 
.43 
n = 20 
p = .03 
promising in terms of establishing an increasing consistency of moral 
reasoning with age. 
The theory of moral motivationpresented in Chapter Two centers 
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around the idea that moral feelings (analogous to preference) which tend 
to be at a higher level than moral reasoning (analogous to spontaneous 
use) serve as a motivator for progression through stages of moral 
reasoning. Moral development could be described then as an individual's 
attempt to bring what he thinks about moral issues in line with what he 
feels about moral issues. However. the fact that all three moral 
reasoning measures in this. study went down with age does not lend 
support to this theory. Again the limitations of a cross-sectional 
rather than a longitudinal study in terms of generalizability are a 
concern. but the results of this study unfortunately provide not even a 
hint of support for this moral motivation theory. Just as with the 
unusual relationship found between age and moral reasoning. it cannot be 
determined if this is due to some other changes in life experiences or 
if the theory is simply wrong. In any case. it seems pointless to 
speculate on the source of motivation for moral development when. in 
this study. the expected moral development simply was not evident. at 
least in a quantitive sense. 
Recommendations 
The recommendations made here based on this study address two 
particular areas--procedural concerns for conducting research of this 
type and suggestions for further studies. 
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During the process of collecting and analyzing the data for the 
study. one fact slowly but surely made itself clear. If at all 
possible. the Standard Moral Judgment Interview should not be used in 
written form. The scoring manual for the test strongly advocates the 
oral version (Colby and Kohlberg. in press) as does the staff at the 
Center for Moral Development and Education. But. the particular 
shortcomings of the written version were not apparent until the scoring 
began. The major difficulty involved unclear or incomplete answers to 
the questions. Though many of the subjects completed the test in a 
clear and articulate manner. others responded with a great number of 
short and vague answers that made the scoring very difficult and almost 
certainly less accurate. Had these subjects been tested with the oral 
interview. these vague responses could have been probed by the 
interviewer. The result would have been a much more valid test and 
probably higher scores as well. 
Secondly. it appears that the inclusion of educational level as an 
independent variable might be useful in future studies. Although 
research (Rest. 1978) suggests that education is related to moral 
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reasoning only up to the bachelor's degree level. the results of this 
study might cause one to be somewhat curious. In an effort to limit the 
influence of educational level. all subjects were required to have at 
least a bachelor's degree. but no upper limit was specified. As a 
result. the sample group turned out to have what could probably be 
considered an abnormally high education level (25 doctorates and 
numerous subjects with several years of graduate study). And most of 
the highly educated subjects. as would be expected. were among the older 
ones in the sample. It seems very possible that in a group with as 
widely differing educational backgrounds as this group. some 
relationship between educational level and moral reasoning might be 
present. If not. this would certainly be strong support for Rest's 
contention that education beyond the bachelor's level makes no 
difference. It is recommended. therefore. that in the future the 
educational level either be strictly specified (i.e. bachelor's degree 
and no more). or else educational level be included as a variable. 
Probably the most interesting possibility for future study would be 
to follow up on the unusual findings regarding the relationship between 
age and moral reasoning. There simply does not appear to be any basis 
in theory or in prior research for expecting that older adults would 
have lower levels of moral reasoning than young adults. If the results 
of this study are not due to sampling error. then some new and 
unexplained process must be taking place. Attempting to explain this 
could take a variety of forms. with longitudinal studies probably being 
the best way. Other methods might include conducting this same study 
again with a larger sample size. or perhaps focusing on the moral 
reasoning of senior citizens. It is possible that some sort of decline 
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in cognitive or intellectual skills may take place in old age that 
really does account for a decline in levels of moral reasoning. But it 
is also possible that reflection or experience is accounting for the 
change. In-depth interviews with older individuals to look for these 
influences might provide a more complete picture of adult moral 
reasoning than that which is provided by the tests used in this study. 
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The Moral Judgment Interview consists of several stories that we 
believe present some challenging issues. Some of you might choose one 
solution to these stories. others of you may choose another. We are 
primarily interested in the explanations or reasons that you give for 
your decisions. Try to justify and explain your statements as fully as 
possible. Very short answers are of no help to us so be sure to 
elaborate fully. Keep in mind that we are more interested in your 
answers to "why" questions than to the "what" questions. Even if you 
give a long description of what you think is right or what you think 
should be done. it is of no help if you do not explain why you think it 
is right or why you think it should be done. Thank you very much. 
Moral Judgment Interview 
In Europe. a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. 
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There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a 
form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. 
The drug was expensive to make. but the druggist was charging ten times 
what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium and charged 
$4000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband. Heinz. 
went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal 
means. but he could only get together about $2000. which is half of what 
it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying. and asked him to 
sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said. "No. I 
discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So having 
tried every legal means. Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking 
into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. 
1. Should Heinz steal the drug? 
la. Why or why not? 
2. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should 
Heinz steal the drug for the stranger? 
2a. Why or why not? 
3. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save 
another's life? 
3a. Why or why not? 
4. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally 
wrong? 
4a. Why or why not? 
5. In general. should people try to do everything they can to obey the 
law? 
Sa. Why or why not? 
5b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do? 
(Continue on to next page) 
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Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to 
his wife. In the newspapers the next day there was an account of the 
robbery. Mr. Brown. a police officer who knew Heinz. read the account. 
He remembered seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized that 
it was Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should 
report that Heinz was the robber. 
1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing? 
1a. Why or why not? 
2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz. Should he then 
report him? 






did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to 
Heinz was arrested and brought to court. A jury was 
The jury's job is to find whether a person is innocent or 
committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to 
to determine the sentence. 
3. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence. or should he suspend the 
sentence and let Heinz go free? 
3a. Why is that best? 
4. Thinking in terms of society. should people who break the law be 
punished? 
4a. Why or why not? 
4b. How does this apply to what the judge should decide? 
5. Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when he stole the drug. 
Should a lawbreaker be punished if he is acting out of conscience? 
Sa. Wh~ or why not? 
Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. 
His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it 
himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $100 it 
cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was 
going to start. his father changed his mind. Some of his friends 
decided to go on a special fishing trip. and Joe's father was short of 
the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had 
saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp. 
so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money. 
1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? 
1a. Why or why not? 
(Continue on to next page) 
2. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this 
situation? 
2a. Why or why not? 
3. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned the money. 
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Is the fact that the father promised the most important thing in the 
situation? 
3a. Why or why not? 
4. In general. why should a promise be kept? 
5. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well and 
probably won't see again? 
Sa. Why or why not? 
6. What do you think is the most important thing a father should be 
concerned about in his relationship to his son? 
6a. Why is that the most important thing? 
7. In general. what should be the authority of a father over his son? 
7a. Why? 
8. What do you think is the most important thing a son should be 
concerned about in his relationship to his father? 
Ba. Why is that the most important thing? 
APPENDIX B 
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• • • • • • • • 
Ill thU qaaatioDZIAira you will be &.&ked to c;ivw your opi.nio~ &bout several 
atc:ri•. Bare ia a story &a an eu.mple. 
E'rlulk Jonas hu beiiD thinlc.i.nc; &bout buyi.nq a car. lie is married, hu two small 
childrlln and e-=- an avera~ income. 'the car he buys wlll be his family's only car. 
It will be uaed JII)Stly to get to work and driv. a.round tcwn, but scmetimes for va-
cation t:rips also. In tryinq to decide whAt car to buy, Frank Jones realized ~t 
there were a lot of qu.st.io~ t:0 considar. Below there is a list of some of these 
questions. 
If you -re !'ranlt Jones, how important 'WOuld each of these co-stions be in aecid-
inq vh&t car to buy? 
Instructions for Part Ar (Sample Quast.iaD) 
On the left hand side chec:Jc one of the spAces by each statement of a consideratio:a.. 
(For instanoe, if you think that statement lll is not ~rtant in makinq a decision 
&bout buyinq a car, check the space on the riqht.) 
Great Much Some tittle No ~ 
l • Whether the car dealer was in the su. block as 
.J where Frllllk lives. (Note that in this sample, 
the person taltinq the quastio=aire did not th.ink 
thi!l was i.mt>ortant in !Mkinq a decision.) 
2. WouJ.d a ~ car be mere econollll.cal = t.l:le lonq 
./ 
run thAn a new car • (Note that a check wu put in 
tha far leftspac. to inctic::at.e the opinion that 
th:Ls is an i.D:portant issue in maltinq a decision 
about btJVinc a car.) 
I ../ I J. Wheth&r the color wa5 areen, Frank's :fa von te colo r. 
4. Whether the. cubic inch diJiplacement was at least 
~ 200. (Not.t" that if you are unsU%11 about what 
•cubic inch di.splacement• means, then mark it •no 
i.mcortance. •) 
.I I I s. Would a large, roomy c::ar .be better than a compact car. 
I I k I &. Whetilar the front conn.i.bil.iea were differen=al. (Note that if a statement sound.!! like gibber::.sh or nonsense to vou, mark it •no i.mcortance. •) 
I.nst=ctions for Part: Br (Sample Question) 
From the list of questiona ar-::lve, select the most ill:portant one of the whole 9%'lllP• 
Put the'nlmlber of the IIICSt i.lzporta.nt question on the top line .belov. De likewise for 
your 2nd, 3rd and 4th IICS1: iJJ;>ortant choices. (Note that the top choices in this case 
vill COlM from the stat!!l!lallts .thai: were checked on the far la:ft-hand side-s-ca.tmcents 
12 and IS -re thouqht to be vezy important. Ill decidinq vh.&'t is the I!Cst importane, 
a person wouJ.d re-read t2 and tS, and then pick one of them as the IIC~rt&nt, then 
put the other oca as • second meat iJJ;>ortant, • and so on.) 
() J:rmes Rest, 1972 
All righrs reserved 
FOURl'H MOST IMPOR'l'7\N'l' 
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In Eul:Op. a WODIIIIU1 vas n•ar ~th f%olll a sp.c:ia.l kind ot cencar. 'l'bera vu on. 
d%uq tha.~ the clactcrs thow;ht lllit;ht sa.va her. It vu a fo:ca o~ rllliima that a druqqiat 
in the ...- toWD had. recently diac:av.red. 'l'b• dnq -• !lxpensiv. to lllllk•, bat tha 
druc;qillt vaa c:ha.rgi.nq ten t;~mas what th• d.ruq coat to lll&ka. Be paid $200 for the 
raclium and duu:qad $2000 for a small dose o~ the Q::uq. 'l'b!l sick -·• husband, Heinz, 
vent to ev~ne he len- to bo:I:%'CV the mgney, but he could only q.t together about 
$1000, which ia h&l~ of vh&t it cost. Be told the dJ:uqg:!.st that his vile vas dyi.nq, 
and u.lted him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. Bat the druqqia~ said, •No, I 
diacovareci the druq and I'm goi.nq to llll.ke mcntry frcm it.• So Bei.n: got ~ate and 
~ to thiDJc about brealci.nq into the IIIIU1 1 s store to sta&l the dri:Lq for his wife. 
Should Bei.n2: steal the d%uq? (Cleek one) 
--- Should stsal it ---- can • t c!eeiaa ___ Should 110t steal it 
~_1!,_1;_ Much Som. Lit•1e No 
l. Whether a COIIII!lmi tv's lllVs are goina' to be UDheld. 
2. Isn't :i.t only n&ttlra.l for a lcv:u1q huaD&nd to care 
so much !br his wif8 that he'd steal? 
3. X. He.:i.n.z vil.linq to J:'i.sk qett.'i.nq sbct as a burglar 
or goi.nq tc jail. for the c:hance th&t ste&l.inq the 
dr.:lcr llli<lht help? 
I 4. Wbetner HII.UlZ :i.s a professionAl wresuer, or has considerable infiuence wit.'l professional wrestlers. 
s. Whether H•.l.ZI.Z i.s stealinq for himself or do:~..nq this 
solelv to help someone else. 
6. Wbather the druqqut 's tigilta to h.i.a :i.nven'ti.an h&-
: to he restlectec!. 
I 7. Wbathar the es.tmce of llvinq ia more ~a.ssinq than the tarmin&tion of dyi.nq, soci&l.ly and i.nd.i-vidually. 
I a. What valuaa ara goinq to be the ha.sia for qovuninq how t;le<:l!lle act tcwlll:'d:l each other. 
g; Whether the cil:uqqJ.st u goi.nq to be a.lloved to hide 
b.nind a worthless law which only protects the rich 
anvbcv. 
I lO. Whether th• l.!IV :i:> thi.s cue is qettinq in t.'le vay of! the most basic claim of any member of societ:v. 
u. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed. for heUl 
so ctteedv and cruel. 
I u. Would ste~g in such a case bring about more tc Cl':lOd for the vhole societv or not. 
!'rOIII the lillt ol questions above, select the four most important: 
Meat important . 
Second Most Important_ 
ThUd Most Important --· 
(Continue on to next page) 
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At Harvard ·oniversity a. group of students, c:a..lled the Students for a. Democ:ratic 
Society (SDS), believe thai: the cniversity shoul.d not have an ii.D!y ROTC p:roqram. SDS 
a't'lldents are against:. the war in Viet Nua, and the arrtrf tr.tininq proqram helps send 
=-n tc fight in Viet Nam. 'l'he SDS students duandad that Harvard end the a.xmy ROTC 
traininq prcqram u a university course. '!'his woulcl man that HU:Va.rd students_ could 
not get umy t:ra.ininq u part of their raqular course WOJ:k and not get credit for it 
tcwarda their daqnu. 
Aqreeing with the SOS students, the S:arn.zd professors ,.,ted to end the ROTC prc-
qram u a univarsity course. Bt.rt the Preaidclt of the oniversity statad that be 
wantad to keep the ll%llrf program on campus u a course. 'l'he SDS atu.dents felt that the 
Presiclent wu ngt goi.nq to pay attention tc the faculty vote or tc their ciemluuia. 
so, one day lut April, two hundred SDS a~:ur!ents walked into the university's 
adm:ini.llt:rat..ion bu.:i.l.c!ing, and told evuyone el.e to qe~: out. 'l:!!.ey s.w.id they were doing 
this to force E&%VU'd tc gel: :rid of the u:my training program u a course. 
Should the a~:udents have taken av.r the administration building? (Check one) 
_Yes, they should take it over can't dac:ide __ No, they shouldn't take it over 
IMPO!m\NCE: 
Great Much. Sollllt Little No 
I 
' 
l. Are the students doing this to really help other 
oeoole or are thev doina it just for kicks? 
I 0!. oo the studants have any right to take over prep-ertv that doesn't belona to them? 
I 3. .00 the studants reallze that they llll.ght be arrests .and fined, and even eX'Ctelled from school? 
I I 4. W"ould. taking over the building in tba lonq run benefit more !'lloale to a areater axtent? 
I I I s. loihether the pru:Ldent stayed withi.n the lim:i.ts of his autbori.tv in icmorina the facultv 'll'Ote. 
I I 6. W"ill the tAkeover Anger the pU:,l.ic: aid q:i.ve &ll students a bad name? 
I I I 7. Is taJd.nq o'V'IIr a bu:U.dinq consuten-c. w.i.th ptinc:ipl o:t iustic:e? 
I I I I I 8. Wculcl &l1owl.."19' one stud..ellt takll-<lVU encouxaqe other student take-overs? 
9. D:Ld. the president bn.nq th.i.s m.aundernan.di.nq on 
d 
I I I I , himsel.:t _by be ina so unreasonable and. uncoo"Derative. 
I I I I I lO. Whedler ruzuunq the uru.versl.ty ouqb.t to be 1.n the hands ot a few adm:i.nistrators or in the hands at til. the peoale. 
I I I ll. Are the a-c.tldents followl.Ilq pri.nc:i.ples which they believe are above the law? 
' 
I I u. loihether or no-c. wu.vers:i.ey decisions ouqnt to be resoected bv atudents. 
Second Host Ilapo.rtant _ 
Ttdrti Host Important _ 
Fourth Moat Important _ 




A llllln !i&Q bean santenced to pri.110n for lO years. A.ftar one year, however, he 
escaped from prison, 1110ved to a n- area of the ctnmt.ry, and tcolc on the n._ of 
'thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enouqh 1110ney to buy 
his own buainass. He wa. fair to his cua'I:OIIIUS , qave hU UIPlcyees top waqes, and 
qave 1110st of hi.s own profits to charity. 'l:hen one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, 
rec:cqnized him as the llllln who had escaped f:rom prison 8 years before, and whom the 
police haci been loolcinq for. 
Should Mrs. Jonas report Mr. Thompson to the pollee and have him sent bac:lc to prison? 
( Chec:lc one) 
_ Should report him em. •t dacide Should not report him· 
Great Much Some Little No 
I 
l. Hun • t Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a 
lone time to orove he isn • t a bad oars on? 
I I 2. Everyti.me s~one escapes pun.i!lhment for a cri.ma, doe!!n 1 t that iuat enccuracre more crime? 
I I l. Wouldn • t we be better off wil:hout pruons &old the aoores!!licn of our lecral svstems? 
I I 1 4. Bas Mr. '!'ho=scn rea.llv oaid h.l.s debt to !!lociet:V? 
I I s. Would society be fUlinq what Mr. 'l'ho:pson shculd fairlv •=ect? 
I 6. What benafibs would prisons be apart from soc1ety, e~eciallv for a charitable man? 
I I 7. How c:culd anyone be so cruel and heartless a.s to !!end Mr. 'nl.omcson to orison? 
I I a. 
Would it be fair to all the prisoners who h~ to 
se.rva out their full sentences if ltt. 'lho:pson -• 
let of:!? 
I I I j 9. Was Mrs • Jones a oood friend of Mr. '!'hoii!Dson? 
I I I I 10. Wouldn't it be a c.it.izen.'s duty tc report an esca criminal, recrar::lle:ss of the eireumstances? ped 
I I I I ll. How would the will of tile people and the publ.ie best be served? 9QOd 
I I t u. Would 9Q1n9' to prison c:Jc any 900d for Mr. Thompson or 'Or.:lteet anvbodv? 
From the list of questions above, select the four 1110st important: 
Most Important 
Second Host Important_ 
Third Most Important ---
!'ourth Most Important __ 
(Continue on to next page) 
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mE DOC'l'OR' S CII.EMKA 
A lady was dyinq of c:ancer which could not be cured and she had only about 
six mgnths to Uv.. She was in tarnl:lle pain, but she wu so weak that a good 
c!ose o:f pa.in-lcillar like mcrphine woul4 make her c!ie sooner. She wu cie.Lir.ious 
and &lmcat crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doc:tor to 
qiva her enough DCrphine to lc.Ul her. She sa:i.ci she ccu.Lcm't stand the pain iUid. 
that she wa. goinq to die in a f- mnt:hs anyway. 
Wbat should tb8 doctar da? (Check one) 
_ He shaul4 qiVII the lady an 
overdo- that will lll&lte her c!ie 
can • t decide S!'lould not 9ift 
- the Oftrdose 
Great Much S<:lu. Little No 
l. Whether the woman • s family is in favor of ¢-vine; 
her the ov.rdose or not. 
I 
:2. Is tha doctor c.bllgateci by the SUie lii!.ws as 
everybody else if qivinq her an overdose would 
be tha sa.me as killincr her. 
I 3. 
Whe'Cller piKlpl.e would be 11111ch beeter off withoue 
aoci.eey reqimenti.nq their li V!!S and. even their 
deaths. 
.4. Wheehar the doctor could 11111lte it appear llke an 
accident. 
s •. Dou the sate haw the ngilt tc .force continuecl 
existence on those who don't want to live. 
6. What ia tn. valu. of deaeh ptior to society's 
oer=ectiVI!! on oer.sonal values. 
7. Wheeher t:he doctor hAs sympa1:hy .for the WCIIIII.Il's 
: aufferinq or care DCre about what society m.i.qht 
think. 
I a. Is hel.p:~.nq tc end another's life ever a raspoz:uubl.e act of coocl!!ration. 
I l 9. Whe1:her only Gc<i should decide when a person • s li!e should end. 
I I 10. Wb..ae va.luaa t:he doctor has set for !Um:sel.f in h..is own oer-~onal coda of behavior. 
I I u. ~ socl.ety afford to l.et every.bo<iy end thu.r lives when thev want to. 
' 
I u. 
can society allow suicides or 111111rcy killillq and 
still pz:otee1: the lives of inc!ividuals. who want to 
live • 
. ·
!'rem the list of questions above, select the tour meat ilzlpor1:ant: 
1'hird Moat Imporunt 
Fourt!l Most Important 
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Mr. Webster w- tl1ll own.r and manager of a qiUI station. He wanted to hire 
another mecb.&nic to help him, but gQOd mechanics were hard to find.. The only 
pa.z:scn he found who se-.:1 to be a qocd mechanic ¥&II Mr. Lee, but he wu Chinese. 
iihile Mr. Webster hi.mllelf didn't ha- anythinq aqa.inst orientab, he wu afraid 
to hire Mr. Lee because many of his custcars d:!.cln 't like orientals. His custoars 
miqht take their business elJiewhere if Mr. Lee wu wor:lc.inq in the qaa station. 
When Mr. Lee ulted Mr. Webster U he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that 
he had already llired somebody else. BUt Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, 
bec:auae he could not find anybody who was a gQOd mec:ha.nic besides Mr. Lee. 
What should Mr. Webster hAv. dcme? (Check one) 
Should h&- hired Mr. Lee Should not have hired him 
IMPOR'rANC!:: 
Gnat Much Some Li ttl• No 
I 
l. Does the owner o:f a business have the rir;ht to 
make his awn b~iness decisions or net? 
2. Whe"t:her there is a law that fc:z:bida raciaJ. d.is-
=i.minaticn in hirinq for jobs. 
I I I I 
J•. Whe"t:her Mr. Webs,;ar ia prejudi.ced aqa;utst 
orien-ca.ls ~elf or whether he JDUnS aachinq 
cersonal in retwlinq_ the __icb. 
I 
4. Whether h.irinq a qocd DSchanJ.c or payinq at:tentJ.on 
to his custcmers' ·wishes would be but fer his 
business. 
I s. What individual differences ought to be relevant in decidina how society's roles are filled? 
I 6. Whether the qreedy and coupetiti- capl.tAl.istic svste.m ouaht to be comDletelv abandoned. 
l 7. Do a majority 
of people in Mr. Webs"t:er's society 
feel like his customers or are a majority against 
-~rejudice? 
I a. Whether !Uring capable llle!1 li.lce ltt'. Lee would use talents that would otherwise be lost to society. 
I I I I 9. Would refusinq the job to Mr. Lee be C:CMJ.Stllllt with Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs? 
I I I 10. Could Mr. Webs-cer .be so hard-he&r~:ed as to re:fuse the job, knowincr how much it means to Mr. Lee? 
I I 11. Whether the Chr:istJ.an comma.ncimant to love your :fellow man acclies in this case. 
I 1.2. If someone's Ln need, shouldn'~ he be helped reqard-less o:f what vou _get back !!rom him? 
Mollt Important 
Second Moat Important 
Fourth Moat Important 




Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mi.meoqraphed newspaper 
for students so thAt he eould express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak 
out against the war in Viet Nam and to speak out aqa.inst some of the school' s 
rul.es, l.ilca the rul.e forbidding boys to -ar long h.a:ir. 
When Fred start:eci his newspaper, he aaked his principal for permission. 
'lhll pr:i.ncipal said it would be al.l right 1f before every publication Fred would 
tw:n in all hi.s a.n:icles for tha principa.l' s app:ova.l. Fred aqreed and turned in 
several articles for app:ova.l. 'l'he principal. approved &.ll.. of thea and !'red 
published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks. 
But the princ:ipal. had not expected th&1: Fred's n.,.papu: would recein so 
IIIUCb attention. Students -re so excited. by the paper that they beqa.n to orqiiJl.ize 
protesu aqainst the h.a.ir requl.ation and ot.b.er school rules. Anqry parents 
Objec:t.ed to !'red.' s opinicns. They phoned the principal. telling him that the news-
paper wu unpatriotic and should net be publlshed. Aa a result of the ris.inq 
excitement, the principal ordered. !':red. tc step publishing. Ele gave u a reason 
that Fred's ac:t.i.vitias -r• disrupt.ive to the operation o:f the school. 
Should the principal stop t!le ni!WIIpaper? (Cheek one) 
_ Should stop it can. t decide Sbculd not stop it 
IMPO~: 
Great Milch some Little No . l . ts the pdncipal more respo~U~ible to students 
or to the ~:~arent:s? 
I 
:l. Oj.d the principa.l gi.v. his word that the ne--
paper could be published for a long time, or did 
]:le just p:r:omise to approve the newspapez one 
1ssue at a t.ime~ 
I I I J .• Would the students start prot:ast:i;l.q even lll:lre if the pr:!.nciPal stom:>ed the newsgaeer? 
I I I 
.· 4. When the welfare of the school is thre&t:enAid, does 
the princi:o;al. have the ric;ht t= qi·."8 orders to 
students? 
I I I s. Does the principal have the freedom of speeCil to sav · '"no• in th.is cue? 
j I 6. I.! tJ:le pr~cipa.l stopped the newspaper would l:.e be oreventina full discussion of i=orta.nt ~:~:oblems? 
I I 7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose taith in the princ::i'!'al. 
I 8. Whether Fred wu ru.Uy loyal to hi.s school and oatriotic to his countrv. 
I I I 9. 
What: effect would a'I:Oppillq the paper have on the 
student • s education in critical thinkinq and 
- . judaments? 
I lO. Whether !'red wu in any way violatinq the ri.qhts o others in l:lublish.incr h,is own ooinions. 
l t I I 
ll.. Whether 1:he pr.i.l:lc.ipa.l should be i.nfluance<i by some 
angry parents when it is the princ:ipa.l that knows 
best what is ~incr on in the school. . 
I I I 11.2- Whe1:her Fred was usinq the newspaper to stir up hatred and discontent. 
From the list of questioru~ abov., select the four moat important: 
Mos1: Important 




COMPREHENSION OF SOCIAL-MORAL ISSUES TEST 
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This next part has several pages in it. It inc I udes four d i I envnas, '!2Ch 
of which is followed by several short paragraphs that make an argument about 
what ought to be done in the story. In this part we are interested not in 
what you think should be done, but In how you understand these arguments made 
by someone else. 
Under each p~ragraph there are four shorter statements. Each of +~ese 
four statemenTs give a slightly different interpr~tation of what the ~aragraoh 
means. 
Read the paragraoh, then read each of the four staTements. We would li~e 
you to do two -:-hines: (1) alcncslde each staremenT in the left hana '11arafn, 
checK one of the three scaces "G~od", "FaIr", or "Poor" corresponding to how 
well the statement in<eroreTs the above paragraoh. Put a ch~ck in one of 
these soaces alongside eacn of the four statemenTs. C2J Then decioe wnich 
one of the four s~atemenTs best interprets the paraaracn. lnaicate rhis by 
putting the letter by the n~r 1 below. Put the ie:ter of the second :es7 
InTerpreTaTion by the numoer 2 and so on. 
Notice that we are not askino you to indicaTe how 10u acree with t~e feu~ 
statemenTs. We are asKing-how wei I the staremenrs agreewi th the paragraoc. 
above. 
Even when you are not certain please make a judgment. if you are not 
sure, guess. 
(Continue on to next page) 
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HEINZ AND THE DRUG 
In Europe a woman was near death from a speciul kind of cancer. There 
was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of ra-
dium that a druggist In the same town had recentlv discovered. The drug was 
expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost 
to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a smal I dose of 
the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to bor-
row the money, but he cou I d on I y get together about S 1000, whIch is ha if of 
what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him 
to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But -rhe druggist said, "No, I dis-
covered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz go-t-~==:::-­
ate and began to think about breaking Into the man's store to steal the drug 
for his wife. Should Heinz steal the drug? 
1. It would be wrong to +ake the drug away from the druggist. He !~­
venTed it and made it, and in our country, that gives him the right of owner-
snip to it. And so if the druggist has done the things that give him the 
right, he can do wnat ~e wants with the drug, and everyone has to respecT 
the right of ownership. 
If on I y the druggist knows how +o make the drua and he's 
got It In his store, everyboa·: has 'to respecT his right 
of ownership. 
The druggist can do whatever he wants with the drug 
because you can't make anybody do anything if he doesn't 
want to. 
If the druggist could invent 'the drug, he probably knows 
what to do with lt, and he has the right of ownership to 
rt. 
If the druggist invents something, by law he is allowed 
to do whatever he wants with it. Anyone who interferes 
with·the druggist's rights is interfering with the law. 
Rank the state~ents from best Interpretation of the paragraph .(1) to worst (4l. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
(Continue on to next page) 
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2. If Yeinz steals, he Is breaking his agreements with other members of 
society. In most countries men h<5ve agreed not to s1.,dl because they see +hat 
not stealing Is better for each one of them. Heinz himself would have to ad-
mit that" law against stealing Is a good law to have. And so if Heinz wants 
to have laws that he and other people think are good to have, he should atide 
by them. 
c.J 
Men consent to laws because they recognize that in the 
long run laws benefit each member of society. One's 
obligation to obey the law comes from this recognition. 
Heinz should not steal because if he does. people wi I I 
think he has broken agreements with them, and they would 
regard him as untrus+worthy. 
Once the law Is set, no one Is rignt in breaking it. ~ 
matter what good Intentions a person may have, if he 
breaks the law, he's In the wrong. 
Heinz has a duty to obey the law because he heloed to 
make the law. If he breaks his agreements, he wi II be 
setting an example that could lead to everyone's brea•-
lng the law. 
Rank the statements from best interpretation of the .Paragraph (I J to worst (4). 
I. 2. 3. 4. 
3. Obeying the law is not as important as obeying your consc·ience. A 
person must decide for himself what he feels is right and good, and hold him-
self to those ideals, or else he Is being untrue to himself. One's conscience 
often demands more of a person than the law. In Heinz's case, If the law is 
differenT from what Heinz thinks Is right, he should still live up to the 
v<5lues that he bei Teves .Jn. 
As long as Heinz feels he's right, he can do as he pleases. 
Your own conscience is more Important than the law. 
Heinz should do what he feels is right and breaking ·~e 
law because he loves· his wife is more important than +hs 
law. 
A person must act according to the set of standards he 
has chosen for himself throughout his life even It these 
standards conflict with the law. 
A person must guide his behavior according to the values 
he was taught to bel !eve are right •. Your conscience tells 
you whether. or not something Is right and good. 
Rank the statements from best Interpretation of the paragraph (ll to worst (II). 
I. 2. 3. 4. 
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STUDENT TAKE-OVER 
At Harvard University a group of students, cal led the Students for a 
De~ocr~tlc Society <SDSl, believe that the University should not hav~ an 
army ROTC program. SOS are against the war In VIet Nam, and the army train-
Ing program helps send men to fight In Viet Nam. The SDS students demanded 
that Harvara end the army ROTC ·training grogram as a university course. This 
would mean that Harvard students could not get army training as part of their 
regular course work and not get credit for it towards their degrees. 
Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the 
ROTC program as a university course. But the President of the University 
stated that he wanted to keep the army program on campus as a course. The SDS 
studenTs felt that the ~resident was not going to pay attention to the faculty 
vote or to their demands. 
So, one day last Aprl I, two hundred SDS students walked into the univer-
sity's adminls•ration bui !ding and told everyone else to get out. They said 
they wer~ doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program 
as a course. Should the students have taken over the administration bui !ding? 
1. The students don't have the right to mmke University decisions ~bout 
trainIng programs. their job is to get an education. Ti·•e man who Is pres-
Ident Is given the right to make these decisions, and he is responsible. And 
so the mmn who Is president is In a different position than anybody else. 
People hi!lve to re:ipect the presidency If they r«~spect the University, and have 
to accept the president's decision. 
The man who has been president has had experience In these 
matters, and knows much more about the university, so It's 
right that he makes the decisions. 
Students who don't respect the university probl!biy don't 
respect the president either, but that doesn't mean they 
know how to ml!ke decisions about training programs. 
The president is the most Important person In a university 
and nobody should be disrespectful. Students should re• 
spec+ him the most. 
The president's job gives him the authority to make the de-
ceslons about the training program. He Is responsible for 
the running of the university. 
Rank the statements from best Interpretation of the paragraph (1) tn worst (4). 
1. 2. :s. 4. 
(Continue on to next page) 
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2. People within an organization agree to cerTain rules for making de-
clsfons. They agree to go along with decisions made according to these rules 
even If they personally d'Jsagree. If an organization had to wait until every-
body agreed with a decision, hardly anything could be done. But In this case 
the president was refusing to follow the faculty vote. He was not following 
the agreed rules for decision making. Therefore, he cannot expect others to 
accept his decisions In this case because they have not agreed to accept his 




In making his decision, the president must consider the 
point of view of other people within the organization and 
not Just his own personal opinion. It Is unfair to keep 
the students from having their say. The president should 
not let his personal views influence decisions that con-
cern ~eople other than himself, and he cannot expect alI 
the people In an organization to accept alI his views. 
The president has to follow the established rules of an 
organization just like everyone eise. Even though he Is 
the president, his position does not give him the right 
to ignore the rules. In facT, the presidenT should seT 
a good example for the other members of the organization 
and win their respect that way. 
The students have to respect the president because of his 
position, but they do not have to resoect his own personal 
op1n1ons. Whenever the president .Is acting In his offi-
cial capacity, his decisions must'be accepted, but when 
he Is acting unofficially, they do not have to be accepted. 
The president did not follow proper organizational pro-
cedures. The university needs to have a method tor 
making:· decisIons which does not requ ire to-t a I agreE!!!!ent 
of everyone. If everyone agrees on certain set procedures 
for ~aking decisions, then everyone must accept decisions 
made by these procedures regardless of their personal 
feelings. 
Rank the atatements from best Interpretation of the paragraph (1) to worst (4). 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
(Continue on to next page) 
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THE DOCTOR' S D I LEMMA 
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only 
about six monThs to live. She was in terrible p~ln, but she was so weak that 
a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was 
delirious and almosT crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask 
the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't 
stand the pain and that she was going to die In a few months anyway. What 
should the doctor do? 
1. Just being a doctor doesn't permit him to make decisions about life 
and death. A doctor Is supposea to help save life in the best way he can. 
His job does not allow him to kif I anybody. If the doctor gives the lady an 




People will not like it If the doctor on his own gives 
the lady an overdose without consulting any other doctors. 
Doctors some-times break the law II ke everybody else. Just 
because a person Is a doctor doesn't make nim perfect, or 
mean that people never ge-t angry. at a doctor. 
There are limits to the rights that one has by being a 
doctor. It Is not part of a doctor's job to decide who 
should live and who should die. 
The doctor's job Is to help people In every way he can. 
He should do what's right, whether people get mad at him 
or not. 
Rank the statements from best Interpretation of the paragraph Cl l to worst C4l. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
2. You can't always go along with the law If you have already committed 
yourself to certain principles. If the doctor believes in helping people even 
If It means helping them end their I ives, then he has to I ive up to his be-
l lets. If the doci"or's conscience tells him to disobey the law in this case, 
then It would be right for him to do so. 
Everybody's conscience will not always agree with the 
law because everybody was brought up differently. The 
doctor should live up to the values that he was tauaht 
were right. -
Obeying the law Is not as Important as listening to the 
doctor's own conscience and really doing what he himself 
decides. If It doesn't seem right to him, why do It? 
A person must decide what Is important In life and act 
according to those values. Being consistent with his own 
values Is an Inner law that the doctor must obey. 
A person's conscience comes first. because he has to live 
with It, nobody else. The doctor.must stand up for what 
he believes In and not be pushed around by anyone, not 
even the law. 
Rank the statements from best Interpretation of the paragraph (1) to worst (4! • 
1 • 2. .3. 4. 
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3. The laws that people have should be ones that the people want to 
have and agree to have. In most countries people feel that they are better 
protected by having a law that torblds.the deliberate taking of life. And so 
the doctor would be breaking his agreement wlth other members of society if 
he gave the lady an overdose. The doctor probably wants to have laws that 
are best for most people and so he should support the law In this case too. 
If a person agrees to follow the ·raw then he should keep 
his promise. Our society would be destroyed lf people 
broke their promises. 
Laws are made by the agreement of the majority. Once a 
I aw is passed everyone must abide by it even if they did 
not vote for it. 
The doctor would be letTing everybody else down if he 
broke the law because he has aoreed to keeo the laws. 
People are expecting him to support the law in this case 
too. 
A person agrees to obey the law because he realizes that 
the law produces the greatest amount of good for himself 
and ~or everybody In society. It is to everybody's ad-
vantage to obey the law. 
Rank the statements from best Interpretation of the paragraph (JJ to worst (4). 
I • 2. 3. 4. 
WEBSTER 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted +o 
hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The 
only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was 
Chinese. While Mr. Webster.· didn't have anything against Orientals, he was 
afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers didn't like Orientals. 
His customers might even Take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working 
In the gas.statlon. 
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster If he could have the job, Mr. Webs-rer 
said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not 
hired anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic 
besides Mr. Lee. What should Mr. Webster have done? 
1. In some countries, the government or king owns everything and •he 
manager can't make all the decisions about how to run his business. But in 
our cou~try, when a man has built up a business and owns It, he has the right 
to manage 1~. And so nobody has the right to come In and tel I him how to run 
his business, even If he Is making bad decisions. Everyone has to respect 
the right of ownership. 
Mr. Webster has worked a long time to build up his 
business, and he knows the most about the business, so 
he has the right to manage it. 
Nobody should try to make Mr. Web~ter's decisions for 
him. He must make all decls"ions himself, even some ~ad 
ones, so that he'll be able to make good ones. 
Unless the law Is changed, nobody can tell Mr. Webster 
how to run his business. The law gives him the right to 
run It the way he wants to. · 
Mr. Webster Is running his business the way that he thinks 
Is right, and so everybody should respect him tor that. 
Rank the statements from best Interpretation of the paragraph Cl> to worst (4), 
t. 2. 3. 4. 
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2. There are always bound to be differences of opinion In a large coun-
try like ours. But laws can be passed even if everyc~~ doesn't agree. It 
most people agree that skin color shouldn't affect hiring, and if a law Is 
passed, then people like Mr. Webster and his customers have to accept the law 
wnether they I ike it or not. Our legal system works so that a majority of 
people can make decisions which are binding on all the people. By this system 
most people's InTerests are best served. 
Laws made by the process of majority rule are made to be 
obeyed. Even If Mr. Webster Is In the minority and dis-
agrees with the law, he still has to obey Jt. If every-
body broke laws that they did not like, then our whole 
legal system would be destroyed. 
Even though Mr. Webster might not like a particular law, 
He should realize that majoritv rule is the best way to 
make laws. He must follow every law made by this system, 
even if he disagrees with it, because this procedure for 
making laws does the most good for most people In the 
long run. 
If Mr. Webster would understand this law and the reason 
why It was passed, then he would realize that the law wil I 
not hurt him. Laws passed by majority rule are tor the 
good of everybody and therefore, they must be obeyed by 
everybody. 
Mr. Webster should follow this law because laws are bind-
Ing on all people whether they like It or not. But act-
ually most everybody benefits from having a legal system, 
and most every body would suffer without any laws at alI. 
Rank the statements from be~t Interpretation of the paragraph (1) to worst (4). 
I. z. 3. 4. 
3. Mr. Webster should hire the Chinese mechanic. If m.inorities are 
generally· denied jcbs, then our society Is placing them at a disadvantage. 
We can't expect anyone to support our society who Is denied its benefits. 
Any reasonable man expects cerTain basic rights In a society the seeks his 
cooperation. If the Chinese mechanic doesn't have a fair chance to get a 
Job, he doesn't have much of a stake in keeping our system going. 
Society should be more cooperative with minorities by 
giving them jobs and a stake In our system. 
It Ts expected In our system t~at every person will have 
basic rights and the benefits of society. 
Denying jobs to minorities places them at a dlsacvantage 
because it denies them the benefits of living In society. 
Society must protect each Individual's basic rights in 
order to win his cooperation. 
Rank the statements from best interpretation of the paragraph (1) to worst (4). 
1 • 2. 3. 4. 
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For each item pair. circle the item (a or b) that most nearly 







Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too 
much. 
The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents 
are too easy with them. 
Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to 
bad luck. 
People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people 
don't take enough interest in politics. 
There will always be wars. no matter how hard people try to 
prevent them. 
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this 
world. 
b. Unfortunately. an individual's worth often passes unrecognized 
no matter how hard he tries. 






b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are 











Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. 
Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken 
advantage of their opportunities. 
No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you. 
People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to 
get along with others. 
Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality. 
It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're 
like. 
I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
Trusting to fate has never turned out well for me as making a 
decision to take a definite course of action. 
In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever 
such a thing as an unfair test. 
Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work 
that studying is really useless. 
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work. luck has little or 
nothing to do with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at 
the right time. 
(Continue on to next page) 
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government 
decisions. 
b. This world is run by the few people in power. and there is not 
much the little guy can do about it. 
13. a. When I make plans. I am almost certain that I can make them 
work. 
102 
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things 
turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. 
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good. 
b. There is some good in everybody. 
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with 
luck. 
b. Many times we. might just as well decide what to do by flipping a 
coin. 
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to 
be in the right place first. 
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability. luck 
has little or nothing to do with it. 
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned. most of us are the 
victims of forces we can neither understand. nor control. 
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the 
people can control world events. 
18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are 











One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you 
are. 
In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by 
the good things. 
Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability. ignorance. 
laztness. or all three. 
22. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades 
they give. 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the 
grades I get. 
23. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things 
politicians do in office. 
(Continue on to next page) 
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they 
should do. 
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are. 
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things 
that happen to me. 
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an 
important role in my life. 




b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people. if 







There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school. 
Team sports are an excellent way to build character. 
What happens to me is my own doing. 
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the 
direction my life is taking. 
Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the 
way they do. 
In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on. 
a national as well as on a local level. 
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